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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has appellant 
jurisdiction over the present cause of action pursuant to 
§78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. On July 2 3, 
1987, the Supreme Court of Utah transferred the Appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over the matter pursuant to §78-2a-3, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred sis a matter of law in 
concluding that Plaintiffs had waived the defense of the absence 
of an indispensable party. 
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that under the present interpretation of the rules of 
procedure, the SBA as a joint payee on a negotiable instrument 
was not an indispensable party to the enforcement of that 
instrument. 
3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Capital City, as a joint payee on a negotiable 
instrument, could enforce that instrument alone because it was 
in possession of the instrument. 
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4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
disregarding material issues of disputed fact based on the 
waiver of substantive right contained in an unenforceable 
guaranty agreement. 
5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
granting summary judgment based on an interpretation of an 
ambiguous contract in the light most favorable to the moving 
party. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
A. 70A-3-116 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended: 
Instruments payable to two or more persons. 
An instrument payable to the order of two or more 
persons 
(a) if in the alternative is payable to any one of them 
and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced by any of them who 
has possession of it; 
(b) if not in the alternative is payable to all of them 
and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of 
them. 
B. Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just 
Adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is 
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action 
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 
or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in 
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
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incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. 
If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be 
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder 
would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination By Court Whenever Joinder Not 
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) 
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether 
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among 
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be 
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person1s absence might be prejudicial 
to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, 
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of 
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will 
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading 
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to 
the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision 
(a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they 
are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject 
to the provisions of Rule 23. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 11, 1986, Plaintiffs/Appellants initiated a 
civil action against Capital City Bank in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah seeking a 
declaration of its liabilities under certain guaranty 
agreements. On April 7, 1986, Capital City filed its Answer and 
Counterclaim in which it sought to enforce the original 
AAML/ms 
3 
guaranty agreements executed by Plaintiffs in favor of the Small 
Business Administration SBA and Capital City. 
On July 25, 1986, Capital City filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment with the district court in which it sought 
dismissal of Plaintiffs1 action and judgment against Plaintiffs 
on the SBA guaranty agreements. Following oral argument on said 
motion, on February 4, 1987, the district court issued a 
Memorandum Decision in which it granted Capital City the 
requested relief. 
On May 20, 1987, the district court entered its Partial 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On June 4, 1987, Plaintiffs 
filed their Notice of Appeal from that Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to November 15, 1979 and for all material 
times thereafter, Plaintiffs, Michael Landes, Sid Seftel and 
Theresa Seftel were the principals of Bagel Nosh Intermountain 
Ltd., a New York corporation (Bagel Nosh) which was engaged in 
the retail sale of bagels in the Salt Lake City area. 
2. On or about November 15, 1979, Plaintiffs caused 
Bagel Nosh to apply for a SBA guarantied loan with Capital City 
Bank in the amount of $300,000. Under the terms of that loan, 
4 
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which is governed by Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
the SBA guarantied 90% of the loan to Capital City Bank. R. 187. 
3. On December 24, 1979, the SBA guarantied loan was 
approved and a loan agreement and promissory note executed by 
Bagel Nosh in favor of Capital City. R. 105-106. 
4. As collateral for the SBA guarantied loan, 
Plaintiffs executed written personal guaranty agreements under 
the terms of which the parties agreed to guaranty payment of the 
loan amount to the SBA and Capital City Bank as joint obligees. 
R. 129, 133. As collateral for their personal guaranties, 
Plaintiffs pledged certain real property located in Snowbird, 
Utah and granted to Capital City, trust deeds covering that 
property. R. 130-132 and 134-136. 
5. Prior to March 30, 1983, Bagel Nosh failed to make 
several monthly payments as required by the loan documents and 
thereby was in default under terms of the loan agreement and 
promissory note. R. 187. On March 30, 1983, Bagel Nosh and 
Capital City entered into a Loan Restructure Agreement whereby 
they agreed under certain conditions, to modify the terms of the 
loan agreement dated December 24, 1979. R. 187. 
6. One of the express conditions to the loan 
modification agreement was that Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes 
5 
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would personally guaranty the entire indebtedness of Bagel Nosh 
to Capital City. R. 137-138. This condition was a material 
change from the prior guaranties executed by those persons which 
guarantied the loan amount to the joint obligees, to wit, the 
SBA and the Bank. R. 129, 133. 
7. The Loan Modification Agreement was approved by the 
SBA and became effective as between Capital City and Bagel 
Nosh. Plaintiffs did not execute the Loan Modification 
Agreement individually and did not execute new guaranty 
agreements in which they guarantied the entire amount of the 
loan to the bank. 
8. On November 29, 1981, Bagel Nosh filed a petition 
for relief under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code. R. 187. Thereafter on or about December 27, 198 5, Bagel 
Nosh stopped making payments to Capital City Bank and thereby 
was in default under the terms of the Loan Restructure 
Agreement. R. 187. 
9. The SBA initially agreed to participate in the loan 
and guarantied ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding 
obligation to Capital City Bank. R. 187. 
AAML/ms 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT ONE: The defense 6f non- joinder of an 
indispensable party cannot be waived by a party but rather can 
be raised at anytime. Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court must analyze the issue of necessary 
and indispensable parties under specific criteria. The trial 
court failed to make the required analysis in the present case. 
Appropriate analysis of the facts of the present case under the 
federal standard compels the conclusion that the SBA as a joint 
payee on the instruments in question is a necessary party and 
if not subject to the jurisdiction of the court is an 
indispensable party. The trial court's nummary conclusion to 
the contrary constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT TWO; Because Capital City is a joint payee on 
a negotiable instrument, §70A-3-116, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
precludes it from to enforcing the instrument alone. The trial 
court's reliance on §70A-3-306, U.CA., 1953, as amended, to 
allow enforcement of the instrument by Capital City constitutes 
reversible error. 
ARGUMENT THREE; Because Capital City cannot enforce 
the guaranty agreements the trial court cannot rely on the terms 
of those agreements to circumvent consideration of substantive, 
material issues of disputed fact regarding impairment of 
7 
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collateral, negligent loss of security interest and modification 
of the terms of the contract between the parties. Reliance by 
the trial court on then unenforceable agreement constitutes 
reversible error. 
ARGUMENT FOUR; Interpretation of the ambiguous terms 
of a contract entered into by the parties subsequent to the 
initial loan agreement must be made in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiffs. By interpreting the loan restructure 
agreement in the light most favorable to Capital City, the party 
moving for summary judgment, and failing to draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the trial court committed reversible error. 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION IS AN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
GUARANTY AGREEMENTS ISSUED TO IT AND 
CAPITAL CITY AS JOINT PAYEES 
The district court summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs1 
contention that the Small Business Administration (SBA) was an 
indispensable party to the present litigation. In support of 
its conclusion that Plaintiffs1 position was without merit, the 
district court stated: 
"In the first instance, the defense has not been 
plead, but additionally, the SBA is not under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an 
indispensable party to this action." R. 312. 
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The first reason for the court's conclusion that the 
SBA is not an indispensable party, to wit, the defense had not 
been plead, is clearly erroneous. Und6r applicable federal 
precedent,1 the issue of the absence of an indispensable party 
may be raised at anytime and in fact may be raised by the 
district court sua sponte. See, McCowen v. Jamieson, 724 F.2d 
1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984)• In fact federal courts have 
considered the issue of whether a party is indispensable when 
raised for the first time on appeal. See, Kroblin Refrigerated 
XPress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 1\0A (3rd Cir. 1986); 
see also, Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson 
Administrator, 390 U.S. 102, 109, (1968). 
Finally, both Rule 12(b) Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the corresponding state rule, provide that a 
defense of failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19 
may be made in any pleading or by motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, or at the trial on the merits. 
Clearly, the defense was properly raised and presented 
to the trial court in the present case through Plaintiffs' 
Response to Capital City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
!A11 parties concede and the trial court recognized 
that based on the nature of the transaction between the parties 
and the terms of their various agreements, the issues in this 
case are governed by federal law. See, United States v. New 
Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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The second basis for the trial court!s conclusion that 
the SBA was not an indispensable party is equally erroneous. In 
its Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated that under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure, the SBA is not 
an indispensable party to this action. 
Standing alone, this cursory treatment of the issue of 
the joinder of an indispensable party constitutes reversible 
error and requires the case be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. See, Wright v. First National Bank of Altus, 
Oklahoma, 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir. 1973). The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and case law interpreting those rules require 
that the determination of the issue of whether a party is 
indispensable under Rule 19(b) must be based on an analysis of 
specific criteria applied to the facts and circumstances of the 
case in question. 
Initially, before concluding that a party is 
indispensable or not under Rule 19(b), the trial court must 
determine if the absent party is necessary to the present 
litigation. See, Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th 
Cir. 1977). If the trial court finds that the party is 
necessary under Rule 19(a), the court is required to order that 
he be made a party to the action. If he should join as a 
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. 
AAML/ms 
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Only after the trial court determines that a party is 
necessary and can not be made a party to the action does that 
court turn its analysis to the issue of whether the party is 
indispensable under Rule 19(b). If the trial court determines a 
party to be necessary and that party can not be joined in the 
action, the Court must consider certain enumerated factors in 
deciding if "in equity and good conscience" the case can 
proceed.2 
These four factors are (1) prejudice to the absent 
party or to those already parties; (2) the lessening or 
avoiding of prejudice by protective provisions in the judgment, 
by shaping relief, or by other measures; (3) the adequacy of the 
judgment which might be entered in the person's absence; and (4) 
2Rule 19(b) provides: 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not 
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision 
(a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience 
the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be 
considered by the court include: first, to what extent 
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be 
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, 
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the 
judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, 
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will 
have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for 
non-joinder. 
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the adequacy of a remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. See, Wright v. First National Bank, 483 F.2d at 75. 
There is nothing in the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision or the Partial Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
that indicates if or how the court analyzed the present factual 
circumstances under these applicable criteria. The trial court 
made no determination whether "in equity and good conscience" 
the case should proceed. 
Rather, it merely stated that "the SBA is not under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an 
indispensable party." R. 312. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recognized in Wright that such conclusory statements are 
of no value without findings of fact to support them. That 
Court went on to hold that such summary conclusions evidence 
that the trial court did not make the determination required by 
the federal rules and therefore did not comply with those 
rules. See, Wright v. First National Bank, 483 F.2d at 75. See 
also, Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d at 559. 
Because the trial court failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of Rule 19 and applicable federal case 
law the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings to determine if the SBA is in fact a 
indispensable party to the present action. 
AAML/ms 
12 
If the trial court had applied the analysis proscribed 
by Rule 19 to the facts of the present case, it should have 
concluded that the SBA is an indispensable party. The United 
States Supreme court has provided a clear statement of the 
correct application of Rule 19 in Provident Bank v. Patterson, 
390 U.S. at 102. As that Court explained: 
The decision of whether to dismiss (i.e., the 
decision whether the person missing is "indispensable") 
must be based on factors varying with the different 
cases, some such factors being substantive, some 
procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some 
subject to balancing against opposing interests. Rule 
19 does not prevent the assertion of compelling 
substantive interests; it merely commands the court to 
examine each controversy to make certain that the 
interests really exist. To say that a court "must" 
dismiss in the absence of an indispensable party and 
that it "cannot proceed" without him puts the matter 
the wrong way around. A court does not know whether a 
particular party is "indispensable" until it has 
examined the situation to determine whether it can 
proceed without him." Id., 390 U.S. at 118-119. 
(emphasis added). 
The overpowering substantive interest that is present 
in this case is the Plaintiffs1 right to not be subjected to 
additional, duplicative liability by the piecemeal adjudication 
of the specific guaranty agreements. 
The guaranty agreements which form the basis for the 
Plaintiffs1 alleged liability were issued to joint payees, to 
wit, the SBA and Capital City Bank. If the SBA is not joined in 
the present action, or the action dismissed, no adjudication of 
13 
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the rights of the parties to the action could adequately protect 
the Plaintiffs from potential additional liability to the SBA 
under the same guaranty agreements. See, Aguilar v. Los Angeles 
County, 751 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Rule 19 speaks to 
possible harm, not only of certain harm.11). Nor is there any 
assurance that the interests of the SBA as joint payee will be 
adequately by protected. 
These concerns have led state legislatures to require 
that instruments payable to the order of two or more persons may 
only be negotiated, discharged or enforced by all of them. See, 
§70A-3-116(b) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.3 The 
guaranties executed by the Plaintiffs in the present case 
constitute instruments payable to the order of two persons, to 
wit, the SBA and Capital City, and therefore pursuant to the 
provisions of §70A-3-116(b), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, are not 
enforceable or dischargeable by Capital City alone.4 
3Although federal law governs questions arising under 
the present SBA loan, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is to be 
incorporated in the case as the substantive federal law to be 
applied. See, United States v. New Mexico, 785 F.2d at 845. 
4
"Instrument" as used in section 3-116 refers 
exclusively to negotiable instruments. See, 70A-3-102(c) 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended. In United States v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 
590 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that the SBA Form 148 guarantee which is the form used 
in the present case was not a negotiable instrument because it 
contained a conditional promise to pay. Id., 753 F.2d at 599. 
This conclusion appears in direct conflict with the language 
found in SBA Form 148 and the present trial court's 
interpretation of that language as creating an unconditional 
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Concerning the policy considerations underlying Section 
3-116 of the Uniform Commercial Code, th£ Court explained in 
McHenry County Credit Co. v. Feuerhelm, ^20 F.2d 525, (8th Cir. 
1983) cert denied 104 S.Ct. 1953: 
The purpose of Section 3-116 is to protect the 
interests of all the parties. It enables all parties 
entitled to payment to receive payment without 
subjecting the maker to multiple liability. Id., 720 
F.2d 527 n. 3; see also, Schranz v. I. L. Grossman, 
Inc., 412 NE.2d 1378 (111. App. 1980). 
The substantive interest of the parties in avoiding 
multiply liability upon instruments made payable to two or more 
persons falls clearly within the criteria enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Provident Bank for the 
determination of whether a party is indispensable to an action 
under Rule 19, F.R.C.P.. In fact, the application of Section 
3-116 (§70A-3-116 U.C.A., 1953, as amended) represents a factor 
4continued 
guaranty. R. 311. The specific language of the guaranties 
provide: " . . . the undersigned hereby unconditionally guaranty 
to lender, its successors and assigns, the due and punctual 
payment when due, whether by acceleration or otherwise, in 
accordance with the terms thereof, of the principal of and 
interest on . . .M. This language contains no conditions to 
payment and requires the guarantors to guaranty the payment not 
the collection of the amount due and owing. This language 
fulfills all the indicia of negotiable instruments. In fact, 
Capital City has admitted the applicability of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in this case in its arguments to the court. 
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that compels the designation of a joint payee as an indispensable 
party.5 
In Vance v. Vance, 601 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1979), the 
Arizona Supreme Court was faced with an analogous factual 
situation. In that case, a husband and wife were named as joint 
payees on a negotiable instrument, to wit, a promissory note. 
Following a divorce, the wife sought to enforce the note and 
brought an action as the sole plaintiff against the payer. 
Addressing the application of Section 3-116 (A.R.S §44-2516) to 
those facts, the Court explained: 
The reasons for A.R.S. §44-2516 are apparent. A 
note made out to more than one party should not subject 
the maker to multiple lawsuits by the various payees. 
The maker has the right to demand that if a suit is 
brought on the note by one of two or more payees that 
payment of a judgment for the full amount due on the 
note will be a complete discharge of the maker's 
obligation as to all payees. Id., 601 P.2d at 607. 
Recognizing the substantive interest of the payer which 
is protected by Section 3-116 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the Arizona Supreme Court concluded the complete relief in that 
action could not be accorded without the presence in the lawsuit 
of the plaintiff's ex-husband. Therefore, under the 
circumstances of that case, to wit, a suit to enforce a 
5In Provident Bank, the Supreme Court recognized that 
based on the facts and circumstances of the specific case, some 
factors to be considered in determining if a party was indispens-
able would be "compelling by themselves. . ." Provident Bank v. 
Patterson, 390 U.S. at 119. 
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negotiable instrument issued to joint payees, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that the ex-husband was a necessary party to 
the litigation under Rule 19(a) Arizona Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Because that person was subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Arizona Court, the Court in Vance v. Vance, was not 
required to reach the ultimate question of whether that 
necessary party would be indispensable uhder subsection b of 
that Rule. 
However, Plaintiffs believe that the substantive 
interests which resulted in the designation of the joint payee 
as a necessary party in Vance v. Vance dictate the further 
conclusion that if not amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
court, such a party would be indispensable in any litigation 
brought to enforce the instrument.6 
The conclusion that a joint payee is a necessary party 
and if not subject to service of process or the jurisdiction of 
the court an indispensable party under Rule 19, is consonate 
with the position taken by the vast majority of federal courts 
6It should be noted that the district court's 
Memorandum Decision provides no insight into whether or not that 
court considered the SBA to be a necessary party under Rule 
19(a). In addition, no inquiry was made by the court concerning 
the voluntary or involuntary joinder of the SBA as a party to 
the action. The mandated or Rule 19(a) is quite clear. If the 
SBA is subject to service of process and is considered a 
necessary party, it must be joined in the action. Yet, it 
appears from the record that this aspect} of Rule 19 was never 
considered by the district court. 
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prior to the recent amendment of that Rule. See, Bry-man's Inc. 
v. Stute, 312 F.2d 585,587 (5th Cir. 1963); see also, Gregory v. 
Stetson, 133 U.S. 579, 586, (1890). 
Although, the amended form of Rule 19 as led to a more 
pragmatic approach to the question of indispensable parties, in 
the case of joint payees, the basic analysis has remained the 
same.7 In Bry-man's, Inc. v. Stute, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeal explained: 
Indispensability at common law was not really a 
jurisdictional ground for dismissing a cause of action 
or bill in equity. It was and is a rule based on 
equity, and the cardinal rule in equity was that all 
persons materially interested in a suit ought to be 
made parties to a suit in order to prevent multiplicity 
7As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. at 117; "The new text of 
the Rule (19) was not intended as a change in principles. 
Rather, the Committee found that the old text 'was defective in 
its phrasing and did not point clearly to the proper basis of 
decision.•. . . Where the new version emphasizes the pragmatic 
consideration of the effects of the alternatives of proceeding 
or dismissing, the older version tended to emphasize 
classification of parties as 'necessary1 or 'indispensable'. 
Although the two approaches should come to the same point, since 
the only reason for asking whether a person is necessary or 
indispensable is in order to decide whether to proceed or 
dismiss in his absence and since that decision must be made on 
the basis of practical considerations, Shaughanessy v. Pedreiro, 
349 U.S. 48 and not by 'prescribed formula.' Niles-Bement Co. v. 
Iron Moulders Union, 254 U.S. 77. The Committee concludes, 
without directly criticizing the outcome of any particular case, 
that there had at times been 'undue preoccupation with abstract 
classifications of rights or obligations, as against 
consideration of the particular consequences of proceeding with 
the action and the ways by which these consequences might be 
ameliorated by the shaping of final relief or other 
precautions.'" 
AAML/ms 
18 
of suits, and that there might be a complete and final 
decree between all parties interested. (citation 
omitted) Obligors have "a right to stand upon their 
contract and insist that they shall not be harassed 
with different actions or suits to recover parts of one 
single demand." (quoting from McAulay v. Moody, 185 
F.144 (C.C. Ore. 1911)." Id., 312 F.2d at 587. 
Plaintiffs contend that application of generally 
recognized equitable considerations to the facts of the present 
case must result in the conclusion that the SBA is at a minimum 
a necessary party to the litigation and, if not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the district court, an indispensable party. 
This result follows the substantial federal court precedent and 
the legislative decree embodied in Section 3-116 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
Additionally, dismissal of the counterclaim of Capital 
City pursuant to Rule 19(b) would have no adverse affect on the 
substantive rights of that party. In the first place, the local 
federal district court represents an alternative forum for 
adjudication of the rights of all parties who have an interest 
in the instruments in question.8 Secondly, the evidence 
presented by Capital City in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment established that Capital City has only a 10% interest 
in the guaranties in question. 
8The existence of an alternative forum is one of the 
factors enunciated in the text of Rule 19(b). See, 3 Moore 
Federal Practice paragraph 19.01. 
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Specifically, the affidavit of M. A. Allem, submitted 
by Capital City in support of its motion, states that the loan 
in question and associated guaranties were made pursuant to part 
101 of the Rules and Regulations of the SBA. R. 137, That 
affidavit goes on to state that the SBA is a participating 
lender in the loan to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding unpaid balance. R. 187. 
In addition, in his affidavit, Mr. Allem, states that 
on November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a Voluntary Petition for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. R. 187. 
The rules and regulation of the SBA which were 
referenced in the affidavit of Mr. Allem, provide that in 
relation to individual guaranty loans, such as presently before 
the court, the SBA is obligated to purchase not more than ninety 
percent (90%) of the outstanding balance of the loan together 
with accrued interest, in the event the borrower has defaulted 
for not less than 60 days. 13 C.F.R. §122.10. However, this 
general rule is superseded by a specific requirement that the 
SBA shall automatically and simultaneously purchase its 
guarantied share of the loan in the event of the commencement by 
or against the borrower (Bagel Nosh) of any bankruptcy 
proceeding. 13 C.F.R. §122.10(a)(2). 
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Therefore, if the guarantied loan is in fact an SBA 
participation loan, as represented to the district court by 
Capital City, then Capital City has previously received ninety 
percent (90%) of the loan amount together with accrued interest 
from the SBA and only retains a ten percent (10%) interest in 
the litigation.9 
Notwithstanding the clear mandaie of the federal rules 
and regulations governing this transaction, Capital City 
contends that the entire amount of the obligation is due and 
owing to it and has presented no evidence, representations or 
other indication to the Court that it intends to deliver over to 
the SBA ninety percent (90%) of the judgment amount. Therefore, 
Plaintiffs have no assurance that they will not be subjected to 
a separate action initiated by the SBA for enforcement of the 
same guaranty agreements which are the subject of the present 
action. See, Aguilar v. Los Angeles County, 751 F.2d at 1094. 
Therefore, based upon the facts and circumstances of 
this case, the trial court committed reversible error by 
summarily concluding that the SBA was not an indispensable party 
to the present litigation. Under the applicable standard 
embodied in Rule 19, F.R.C.P., the SBA is a necessary party 
9The fact that counsel for Capital City argues that the 
SBA has not participated in the loan does not constitute 
evidence of that fact. R. 248. See, Christianson v. Colt 
Industries Operating Corp., 609 F.Supp. 1174, 1185 (D.C. 111. 
1985). 
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which if not subject to the jurisdiction of this court becomes 
indispensable to the adjudication of the present controversy. 
This Appellate Court should reverse the judgment entered against 
Plaintiffs and remand the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings to determine if the SBA can be joined in the 
litigation and if it can't this Court should require dismissal 
of the action. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY RULING THAT CAPITAL CITY AS A HOLDER 
OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENTS COULD 
ENFORCE THOSE AGREEMENTS 
It is universally recognized by the federal courts that 
the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of 
establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
involved in the case and that the party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See e.g., Snyder v. United States, 717 F.2d 
1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1983). 
The burden on the party moving for summary judgment is 
affirmative and the party seeking summary judgment has the 
burden of showing the absence of genuine issues of material 
fact, and the right to judgment as a matter of law even where 
the other party would have the burden of proof at trial and even 
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if the opponent presents no conflicting evidentiary matter.10 
See, McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1134 (D.C. C.R. 1985). 
In addition, the district cpourt must view all 
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment and where different ultimate inferences may be drawn 
from the evidence presented by the parties, the case is not one 
for summary judgment. Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 
1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1984); Exnicious v. United States, 563 
F.2d 418, 423-424 (10th Cir. 1977). 
In the present case, Capital City, as Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, moved the court for the entry of partial summary 
judgment on the issue of the Plaintiffs1 liability to Capital 
City under the personal guaranties in question. The guaranties 
which were admittedly executed by the Plaintiffs were introduced 
by Capital City as evidence of the Plaintiff?1 indebtedness. 
In its Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Capital City presented the following argument as the 
basis for the court's award for summary judgment on its 
counterclaim: 
10The Federal Rules do not require the non-moving party 
submit any evidence in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment. See, Kaszuk v. Bakery and Confectionery Union, 791 
F.2d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1986). 
AAML/ms 
23 
"Plaintiffs admit that the note, Seftel Guaranty, 
Seftel Trust Deed, Landes Guaranty and Landes Trust 
Deed are genuine. Those instruments are all in default 
as established by the Affidavit of M. A. Allem. 
(Exhibit "13"). Consequently, Capital City is entitled 
to Summary Judgment on its counterclaim against Seftel 
and Landes, for the balance due on the note and 
foreclosing Capital City's interest in the real 
property." R. 96. 
In its Reply Memorandum, Capital City expanded upon 
this argument by explaining that the holder of a negotiable 
instrument has the right to sue on the note regardless of actual 
ownership. Counsel for Capital City went on to explain that 
Capital City, as the holder of the legal instruments, is 
entitled pursuant to §70A-3-306 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to 
collect the note through suit or otherwise, and is entitled to 
recovery thereon. R. 247.11 
Relying on the position advanced by counsel for Capital 
City, the trial court concluded: 
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the Plaintiffs 
have executed unconditional guaranties in favor of 
Capital to induce a loan to their company, Bagel Nosh. 
Bagel Nosh has defaulted, and Capital is entitled to 
resort to the guarantees which the Plaintiffs 
originally make. R. 311-312. 
In its Memorandum Decision the court explained that for 
the purpose of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the court had granted Capital's motion on all the bases alleged 
i;LIn his supplementary Affidavit filed in support of 
Capital City's Motion, M. A. Allem represented that Capital City 
was the legal holder of the note and guaranties involved in this 
action. R. 252. 
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by Capital City in its moving papers and supporting documents. 
R. 312. Therefore, this Court must conclude that the trial court 
relied upon Capital City's position that as the holder of the 
various negotiable instruments it was entitled to enforce them 
under the provisions of §70A-3-301 U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
This conclusion, to wit, that the holder of the 
instruments may sue to enforce them, while generally correct, is 
inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore the 
trial court's reliance on that legal position constitutes 
reversible error. 
It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs executed the 
guaranty agreements in conjunction with the Bagel Nosh loan. 
Those guaranty agreements read in pertinent part; 
In order to induce SBA and Capital City Bank 
(hereinafter called 'Lender'.) To make a loan or 
loans, or renewal or extension thereof, to Bagel Nosh 
Intermountain, Ltd. (Inc.) (hereinafter called the 
"Debtor"), the undersigned hereby unconditionally 
guarantees to Lender, its successors and assigns, 
(emphasis added). R. 129, 133. 
The Plaintiffs did not, as alleged by Capital City and 
accepted by the district court, execute unconditional guaranties 
in favor of Capital City. Rather, Plaintiffs executed 
unconditional guaranties in favor of Capital City and the SBA as 
joint payees. Nothing in the language of the guaranties or the 
evidence presented to the district court supports the contention 
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that the guaranties were to be payable to either party alone or 
in the alternative. 
Under these facts12 and the applicable provisions of 
§70A-3-116 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, the guaranties, unlike the 
note, could not be enforced by Capital City alone.13 
The district court's conclusion that Capital City could 
enforce the guaranties whether based on a factual mistake, to 
wit, that the guaranties were issued to Capital City alone, or a 
erroneous legal conclusion, to wit, that Capital City as holder 
of the guaranties could enforce them alone, constitutes 
reversible error and requires this Court vacate the judgment 
against Plaintiffs and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
12If the guaranties were made to the order of the SBA 
and Capital City in the alternative for instance by the use of 
the disjunctive "or" rather that the conjunctive "and", Capital 
City as holder of the instruments could have proceeded to 
enforce them. See, §70A-3-116(a), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
13The promissory note which was not at issue in this 
case was made to the order of Capital City and could have been 
enforced by Capital City alone against Bagel Nosh, the sole 
debtor, under §70A-3-301, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, as argued by 
counsel for Capital City. The error of law occurred when the 
trial court extended this argument from enforcement of the note 
to enforcement of the guaranties. It is interesting to note 
that in its argument to the court contained in its reply 
memorandum, Capital City presented the argument that as holder 
of the note it was entitled to recovery thereon without 
expressly stating that it had the same right to enforce the 
separate guaranties. R. 247. 
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ARGUMENT THREE 
BECAUSE CAPITAL CITY CANNOT ENFORCE THE GUARANTY 
AGREEMENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW THE EXISTENCE OF 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
It is apparent from the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision that its determination of the validity of Plaintiffs1 
claims against Capital City concerning impairment of collateral, 
reckless loss of a security interest, and modification of the 
obligation and guaranty agreements was based upon the ability of 
Capital City to enforce the express terms of guaranty agreements. 
In relation to each of these issues, the trial court's 
decision that Plaintiffs1 position was without merit was based 
on the express waiver of rights contained in the SBA Form 148 
guaranties. For example in relation to the alleged reckless 
loss of a security interest, the district court explained in its 
Memorandum Decision that "[u]nder federal law, Capital has no 
duty to maintain or perfect a security interest in the 
collateral in that the Plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that 
defense." R. 310. 
Again, in relation to the issues surrounding the 
modification of the guaranty agreements, the trial court 
explained that "under the terms of the guaranties, modifications 
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have been authorized in advance by the Plaintiffs/guarantors." 
R. 311.14 
Because the moving party, Capital City, is unable to 
enforce the guaranties in question the district court should not 
have relied on the terms of those contracts in granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgments dismissing Plaintiffs1 complaint. 
Again, if Capital City cannot enforce the guaranties as 
a matter of law under the provisions of §70A-3-116 U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended, it cannot rely on the defense of waiver based on 
those contracts nor establish its right to summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs1 claims. 
Therefore, the trial courtfs reliance on those 
contracts and the language contained therein to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' action constitutes reversible error. 
14The district court went on to state that the 
modifications to the underlying indebtedness cannot be 
complained of at this point by the guarantors where they have 
paid under the guaranty since the default of the principal 
debtor Bagel Nosh, and if not estopped at this point, have 
simply given their consent to modification. R. 311. There was 
no factual basis for this conclusion in the record before the 
trial court. While counsel for Capital City had represented to 
the court that payments had been made by the Plaintiffs on the 
obligation following the default and bankruptcy proceeding of 
Bagel Nosh, those were merely representations of counsel 
unsupported by substantive, admissible evidence. The court nor 
the moving party on a motion for summary judgment can rely on 
inadmissible evidence or the assertions of counsel in granting a 
motion for summary judgment. See, Christianson v. Colt, 609 
F.Supp. at 1185. 
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ARGUMENT FOUR 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF DISPUTED FACT EXIST 
CONCERNING THE PARTIES1 INTENT TO 
REVOKE THE ORIGINAL GUARANTIES 
In ruling upon the present Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs were foreclosed 
from raising the issue of the modification of the underlying 
obligation because of the waiver language contained in the 
guarantee agreement. The ability of Capital City to enforce 
those guarantees has been previously addressed in this brief. 
However, the district court, in rendering its decision on this 
issue, failed to consider another issue raised by Plaintiffs in 
relation to the validity and enforceability of the original 
guaranties. 
Specifically, in response to Capital City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs argued that the language of a 
Loan Restructure Agreement entered into by Capital City and 
Bagel Nosh evidenced an intent on the part of the parties to 
revoke the original guarantees and execute new guarantees under 
the terms of which Messrs. Landes and Seftel would guarantee 
repayment of the entire obligation to Capital City. R. 137.15 
15The Loan Restructure Agreement excluded Theresa 
Seftel from the condition of guarantying the obligation to the 
Bank. R. 137. Theresa Seftel was a joint guarantor with Sid 
Seftel on the original guaranty agreement. R. 129. Therefore, 
not all Plaintiffs were requested to be continuing guarantors 
under the Loan Restructure Agreement. 
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As previously discussed, the original guaranty 
agreements were issued to the order of both the SBA and Capital 
City and related directly to the SBA guaranteed loan to Bagel 
Nosh. Under the terms of the Loan Agreement dated December 24, 
1979, the SBA agreed to participate to the extent of 90% of the 
total obligation of the Debtor. R. 105, 106. 
Following several months of default16 on the primary 
obligation, Bagel Nosh and Capital City entered into a "Loan 
Restructure Agreement" on March 30, 1983. R. 137, 138. That 
agreement states in pertinent part: 
Capital City Bank, (the Bank), agrees to modify the 
terms of the loan agreement dated December 24, 1979, 
between the Bank and Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., 
Inc., (the Borrower), under the following conditions: 
* * * 
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally 
guarantee the Bank's loan to the Borrower. Each is 
16The period of time in which Bagel Nosh was in arrears 
is significant because of the federal regulations governing SBA 
guaranteed loans. Section 122.10 of title 13, Code of Federal 
Regulations provides that in relation to individual guarantee 
loans, such as the one in question in this case, the SBA is 
obligated to purchase not more than ninety percent (90%) of the 
outstanding balance of the loan authorized thereunder, together 
with accrued interest, in the event the borrower has defaulted 
for not less than 60 days. 13 CFR §122.10. Notwithstanding the 
extended default of Bagel Nosh prior to the execution of the 
loan restructure agreement and the regulations regarding such 
default, counsel for Capital City argued in support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment that at the time of the Summary 
Judgment Motion, the SBA had not yet purchased any portion of 
the debt. R. 248. 
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personally liable for the entire indebtedness to the 
bank. . . . 
6. Any item in the Loan Agreement dated December 
24, 1979, that is not specifically modified by this 
Loan Restructure Agreement remains in full force. 
* * # 
9. The foregoing modifications will not take 
effect until they are accepted by the Small Business 
Administration and by First Variable Rate Fund. 
When considered together, the language of this Loan 
Restructure Agreement evidences an intent on the part of all 
parties to modify the terms of the original agreements between 
the parties. One of the express modifications is that Messers. 
Landes and Seftel would personally guarantee the entire 
i 
indebtedness to Capital City.17 
It is reasonable to infer from the facts surrounding 
the Loan Restructure Agreement and the language of that contract 
that the parties intended to revoke the original guaranties, 
under which the Plaintiffs' guaranteed the repayment of the 
indebtedness to both the SBA and Capital City, and execute new 
17Plaintiffs conceded that the express language of the 
Loan Restructure Agreement is somewhat ambiguous. However, in 
considering a Motion for Summary Judgment all evidence must be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of America v. Medlin, 538 
F.Supp. 585, 587 (N.D. 111. 1982). And, the district court must 
view all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See, 
e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d at 1135. 
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guarantees wherein they would guarantee the entire indebtedness 
to Capital City.18 
This issue of the intent of the parties concerning 
revocation of the original guaranties and the execution of new 
replacement guarantees constitutes a genuine issue of material 
fact which renders entry of summary judgment inappropriate in 
the present case. See, Rockwell International Corporation v. 
Riddick, 633 F.Supp. 276 (N.D. GA 1986). As the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained in Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692, 
694 (7th Cir. 1976): 
"The interpretation of a contract, the terms of which 
are disputed, is very much a matter of the intent of 
the parties who entered into that contract. Questions 
of intent are particularly inappropriate for summary 
judgment." 
The district court's confusion regarding the issue of 
revocation and its interpretation of the Loan Restructure 
18This conclusion is supported by the fact that 
following execution of the Loan Restructure Agreement, the SBA 
has allegedly not participated in any way in the transaction. 
Yet, if the SBA was still a party to the transaction the filing 
of the bankruptcy petition by Bagel Nosh on November 29, 1984, 
would have automatically triggered the SBA's participation in 
the transaction under Section 122.10(2) of Title 13. That 
subsection states: "SBA shall automatically and simultaneously 
purchase its guaranteed share of the loan in the event of the 
commencement by or against borrower of any bankruptcy 
proceeding, receivership, dissolution or of a creditor's rights 
proceedings pursuant to the provision of the Guaranty 
Agreement." 13 CFR. §122.10(2). 
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Agreement in the light most favorable to Capital City, 
constitute reversible error and require this Court to vacate the 
summary judgment based upon those erroneous conclusions and 
remand the matter to the district :ourt for further 
proceedings.19 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erroneously granted Capital City 
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against it and 
enforcing personal guaranties executed by the Plaintiffs to the 
order of Capital City and the SBA as joint payees. Pursuant to 
applicable federal case law and the provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, Capital City should not have been 
allowed to enforce the terms and conditions of the guaranties in 
question against Plaintiffs without joining the SBA as a party 
19The district court's consideration of the issue of 
revocation which surrounds the Loan Restructure Agreement seems 
to ignore the most obvious fact in support of the Plaintiffs 
position which is the continuing prosecution of this case by 
Capital City. Without exception, in the reported cases 
involving SBA guarantied loans, the SBA and not the 
participating bank is the party plaintiff. See, e.g., United 
States v. Perez, 528 F.Supp. 206 (D. Puerto Rico 1981). In fact 
participating banks have gone so far as to initiate suit against 
the SBA to require it to participate in the repayment of 
defaulted loans. See, First National Bank of McMinnville, Tenn. 
v. Kleppe, 409 F.Supp 110 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). The obvious 
inference to be drawn from the absence of the SBA in the present 
litigation is that it was released from its obligations 
concerning this loan at the time the Loan Restructure Agreement 
was executed or sometime prior to that agreement. 
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to the litigation. In addition, in granting summary judgment 
for Capital City, the trial court erroneously interpreted the 
terms of an ambiguous contract in the light most favor to 
Capital City and erroneously failed to consider reasonable 
inferences of fact in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs request this court vacate the Partial 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered by the district court 
and remand the matter for determination of the status of the SBA 
as a necessary or indispensable party and if the SBA can be 
joined, a trial on the merits. 
Dated this ^>* day of October, 1987. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
The Walker Center, Suite 560 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fap day of October, 1987, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, 
postage prepaid, addressed to the following individual: 
Steven T. Waterman 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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r ttefscftd J. Saperstein (2861) Karen C. Jensen (1680) Steven T\ Waterman (4164) WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital Citjy Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
vilNo. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
EXHIBITS TO CAPITAL CITY BANK'S 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INDEX OF EXHIBITS 
Exhibits Description 
1 Note of Bagel Nosh 
2 Records of Utah Department of Business Regulations regarding Bagel 
Nosh 
3 Bagel Nosh Bankrutpcy Statement of Affairs 
4 Seftel Guaranty (SBA Form 148) 
5 Seftel Trust Deed 
6 Landes Guaranty (SBA Form 148) 
7 Landes Trust Deed 
8 Loan Restructure Agreement 
9 Records of Utah Department of Business Regulations regarding Powder 
Hound 
10 Judgment by Default (Crossroads v. Powder Hound) 
11 Answers of Seftel and Landes (Crossroads v. Powder Hound) 
12 Utah Division of Commercial Code UCC-11 Search regarding Bagel 
Nosh 
13 Affidavit of M.A. Allem (Capital City Bank) 
14 Utah State Tax Commission, Tax Warrant regarding Seftel and Landes 
15 Judgment by Default (YESCO v. Seftel) 
16 Affidavit of Richard L. Skankey (Olympus) 
DATED this 2^/ day of July, 1986. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Waterman 
Attorneys for Capital City Bank 
• JS^SSbSi io~t Ptfitffrtr 1 * . . i*_13L 
f «* « * k e re-reive*. thr «*«Vmiaj»e* prow). * en to pa% to the order of C A P I T A L C I T Y BANK 
(Payee* 
it ii* ..'CM• m tht ntv of S a l t Lake smir «f Utah 
i holder H option, at Mich other plan a*, mnv he d«>H(^3|,.H (rum time to time bv the holdrr 
IHREI' HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100—
 do ,„„ 
•write i ut amount) 
* th int'-rem or unpaid principal computed from thr date of each ndvanrr to thr undirnignrd .it thr rate of S i x t e e n p f f , r w t 
I' ' urn im, payment to be madi in inntnllmcntn a*> foll-mn 
Equal successive monthly installments of 3,537.50 , including 
principal and interest, beginning Three (3) months from zhe date of tms 
.Voea, with the final installment due and payable Eight (8) years from the 
date of this Sote, and with the further provision that each said installment 
shall be applied first to interest accrued to the date oi receipt of said 
installment, and the balance, if any, to principal. 
It is further agreed that interest shall continue at the above stated rate 
for one full calendar semester fron the date of Note. Thereafter, interest shall ^ 
be adjusted up or down on the first day of January, April, July, ard October, by * 
adding 2-3/4 percent to the New York Prime. Borrower must b<» giver notice of thecal 
changed interest rate within ten days of the effective date. 
I* i\n cm of m\ installment of principal or interest ewmf: on this Notr mav bf mad« prior to the maturity date thrmof *tihoui 
p. n a m 
I V n rm Jndcbtednrns" an unrd hrrrin nhall mean thr indebtedness evidrnrrd by thin Notr nrluding principal interest, 
in I t \p» ns« s, whether coming ni, now due or r ereafter to breomr due and whether heretofore o» rontemporatieounlv h» rewnh or 
I » rt , Iter rontra -ted. Thr term "Collateral" a*, usrd in thin Note nhall mean ttnv funda, guaranties or other prooertv or ripm-
i . !• m »f im n iture uhntnoet^r or the pro* r r ^ then of *hich may have been, are. or hereafii r max be hypothecated diref !v or 
n '»r '»'% I" th» under^ignrj j others, ir connection with, or .in nerurtty fot. thr )ndebtcdne«n 01 . n\ pari ti.^reif fne ( oil ner-
i •• I • arl part thereof, shall m rure tht lndmtednr* n ^ md each part thrreof I V covenant*, and rendition* net forth or r» H rred 
• ••. n\ and a(i instrument* of hvp luSrcation lonntttuting thr Collateral arr hercf»v incorpor ited ir thin \ o r an T i v n a n i * and 
i nv i f ihe underpinned with thr name force and effect i * though nuch t nven.intn and ronditonn were fully set firth h«r*m 
?h» lntl> hie Inenn nhall imir eilmielv I M M H I I due aw* payable, without notice or demand, upon the appointment of a trrr ver or 
'• i. «'. r r \ heth«.f voluntan 01 involuntary for thr unde»ntgnee" or for any of it*» pr »prrty, or upon thr filing of a petition b> or 
.. itn» th» und«rs»pieo mder the j 'ovi^ton* o' an> Stair innotxincy law or under the provtm ,nn r>f the Bankruptcy \ct of 1898. 
. f ie i d» d or upon the n A m p l»% the undersigned of e anm foment for thr bmefn of itn crediiom Holdrr i-» authorized to d< 
• in ai or ,\n\ part oi tht Indt bfdnrsn imm» d atrlv lue and payable upon thr happening of at ) of the following event* 
• I ra i lu r * o pa% an* part of i\ r InJrbiednmn %»hrn dur t2) nonperlomtanre bv the undersigned of any agreement with, or .»nv con-
.»»n •» onpo»ed b\ . Holder or ^n all Huntn« ns ^dminmtrMion (hereinafter callrd "SHA" ) . or rither of thrtr, with respert to ne In-
i f.t'dnesH (3) Holder n dmro»er\ of thr undrrm^mrd • lailurr in any application of ihr andrimgnrd to Holdrr or Sf l i to d\>+( lonr 
ir\ I n det med b\ Holdrr to b* mntrnal or of the mnl.in*, therein or in any of thr said agrrmirnn or in any affidavit or oil rr doc 
i» «nt« -ittat ittrd in connection with *nid applu ation or tSr indrbtrdnrwn, of an* mmrrprr^rntation by, on behalf of, or for the bene-
li* of th»' undersipnrU. (4) the r ^ or^.ini/atioo fothrr th m a rcorpaniiation pursuant in any of the prnvmionn ol thr Bankruptcy Sex oi 
.
u 08 a- amt nd« d) or mergrr I»I C3n-totidation of the uidernicned <or the making of any agreement therefor) without the prior written 
< i n««eni of hold. r. l$t he und* inigned's failure duly to account to Holder's *atinf.irtton, • ! *«ch time or time* an ffoMer m ly re-
<] nrr f r nnv of thr Collateral, «ir procrrdn thereof, coming into the control of th# undermpied or (61 the institution of «n> nuit 
«ff« enn* th* undersigned deem «d b> Holder to affect adversely itn interest hereunder in ihr ( ollnit ral orotherwme Holdei n fail-
tin to * «t rcinc it«* ri^dttn under thin paragraph shall n«M e institute a waiver thereof. 
000105 
•SIO ANO ) M A ARC O i W L l t l 
, W » f N «M», • •*«*« *4*U * • • • *•> «««•> 
I * i9f ««g nWiaaf «• tfcm p«#a#raaa* a r i » « «f a<*apaw 
r «B»» p H t a>fwn<ei. atjeoj 4a*W. *J—a» • ! A * n«ht«. "*"*•*.-!„•*. privat^ee*. «»r a*«e*« of Holder «-t©n <»*ly 
i w w H im%*mm «WQ la> i»ni laaunoy aai *>ara> «4 tax** -Ji«ll W rovJlattve «*«tk t«d ia ««Mri*a to every oittt*r r i ^ t . rente U . prtvi 
V « r , « t fmm*9 mmmmt W w h f f eoaaawa] *• ' • • • • a l Rnl«ef. *he he* at t i * »»e ut e»j aity. to si •i«t<* or otker » «%«• 
Tne nader* taped a green t« take alt aere^sar* *tep*: to administer, sapecvise. preserve, an I pro'eet the C sllateral. tnd r»-ca*«it<»-», 
••f IOV a Moo take* by Holder, three shall be no duty tpen Holder ta tat* reopen. Hie andersi«ned shall p*\ i l l f ip»nM's if \nv na-
•ure, »h> thi r iae«rre I ia or ta t of court. and whether •aeutird be'ore «t* after this. Note shall >erom»» due at us maturity iat<* or )iher. 
wise ir.rlui tag but oat I tattled to reasonable attorney's fees and c«st< which llnlcer mav de.»Ti nccessar* o» proper o < nnn' , riton 
v\nh th«* satisfaction of ibe InJ-btednesa or the administration supervision, pre*< rvafioa. pn tertioo of f ind i<tm« Su» nit limited to, 
the m iinten incr of adequate in-menace) or ike read rail ion «r*on die Collateral Hoi ier is autkortaeM to pay at in* time md from time 
to time my «ir ail of tack e«pe«sc». add the anoint of sqch pavment in tke amount of tke Indebtedness, and k trge <mer« nt thereon 
if the r»ie specified herein with respect to tke principal aawmat of thi^ Note. 
Tke security rights of Holder and i t * tssigrs kereunder shall not r>e impaired l»v Ifoldcr s s«le, Hvpntkec *11 »n ,r rr h«p«ih» cation 
•if inv r» tte of tke undersigned »r any item of the Collateral, or b» any tadnlgenrr. including Imi noi limited to <a> inv 'enewjl . e*-
tension or modification wkicb 'folder mav graa witk respect to tke Indebtedness or any part 'Hereof, or (b) JOV »irr*»n u«r, ompro-
nt -.e n leiKt«, renewal, ettenntoa, e*ckan«e. or -«Qk«tilMti«tt which Holder miv print m reopen <\f tke C ^ l l i f r ii M (r) inv indul 
«•«««• cr mi« <l in renpert of tay rndcir-er. guarantor, or «urciv. The pacrha^cr, i<*<«ienee, trar*«(>re«. or plrdy* e ( thiM v»t« . 'he 
< «illate-il, mv icuaraatv. aad anv otker document <or aav of them), told, a^ta j i rd , iraa^ferrco, ^ledced. or rep|rj^»*d. ^hall for»h«itk 
WF i nine v«««* .«d «uk M*\ entitled lo eterct^e all tke power* and n^M* fivfri kv thi* Note and il l ipphration^ of he indersi^cd to 
II I li r r >|f \, i«» if said par chaser, as^i^aief transferee, or pledgee were oriftn^lK named i«* J' I»CI* in tkts Note in«i m s.»nl appli-
< M<n ipjilic itioos 
I k i - j»r« missocv note t% (civ«-n to secure a I iaa *h«« k M H in making or m *fcicS it i* pa"ic»patmn jnd pursti mi > f* »rt 101 >f 
»k« H«t( •«* a«d KegataMoas of S f l \ \\\ V.r R IDt l» IU, ihis instrument «s to ke -onstmed anA <%»h« n SHA is the H >!!• - •
 f»artvi 
n mter *s0 enforced ia aeenrdance v»itk applicable y^^"*^ li»*» 
T?-«3 13 TO CSftTJ^ THAT THi 
AUOVf IS A TR'S ANO COfV 
R6CT CC?Y Qf T>iS ORlGINAt 
BAGEL NOSH INTEMOUNTAIN, LTO. (INC.) 
Sidney > C t c e ^ ^ V t c G PreYrTTen 
MY COMfSSIQN EXPl^gg ^ai-a« 
\a« —t orporatv appheantn maat naeeute Note, in corp«irite name, by dulv iuthon«ed offi *er, and seal ( run be af'ned iad luly 
esied partner«liia applicaatn mum eaeente Note »n firn n line, to gather witk nianature of t general partner. 
t» easier an Lf-Ji g ^ P * * * 1 C £ t T * * * * * * » * * * • • • ' * — ««*V4 H * * * * * * * • * • • w ** W^ - b * W1**%1 •• • * « * * - • * " • * * (SBA or *<ker Uatdang laetatastaeeO 
B a s e l N 0 8 h I n t e r m o u n t a i n . , L T p t . . ( ! 0 £ . * J L i - (hereinafter called the -Debtor i the Undersigned 
ufwwrdaTcewith the tame thereof, of the principal of and interest on and all <|tber S U A . payable, or staled to be payable with respect to the » • « j l ^ 
Debtor made b* the Debtor to Under dated i ? - ? * r J A s the principal amounjof f . 3 . 0 0 ^ 0 0 0 OO.Uiintere. . the rate of S i x t e e n p . , ^ 
pc- annum. Such note, and the interest thereon and all other turn* payable with respect thereto are hereinafter collectively called Lubiliiiea As * « u r n £ 
tor the performance of this guaranty the Undersigned herebv morgages pledges assigns, transfers and delivers to Under certain collateral <if any> l isted 
n the scheduiTon the revert side hereof The term 'collateral- as used herein .ball mean any funds, guaranoes. agreement, or otf 
Mere.!, of any nature whatsoever, or the proceeds thereof which may have been are or hereafter may be mortgaged, pledged. 
debZred directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the Debtor or the Indcrs.gned or any other party to Under or to the holder of I 
f   'of 7 7. *gJara t "i  . . .fer.aad , b o^
.the'scheduTon the revert side hereof The term. « U ^ » - ^ ^ ^ ^ £ 
the aforesaid note ol the 
Debtor'V'which may have been, are. or hereafter may be held b% anv party " trustee or o i t a w i w aa secunty whether immediate or underlying, (or the 
^rformanee of this guaranty or the pat meat of the Liabilities or an, of them or any secunty therefor 
The Undersigned w.ive. any notice of the incurring b* the Debtor at any tube of any of the Liabilities, and waives anv and all presentment. <^nuad. 
protest or notice of dishonor nonpavment or other default with rcpect to any M the Liabilitte. and any obligation of any parly at « r j i a e ^ m p ^ 
Tn the collateral The Undersigned herebv grants to Under full power in it. uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned, hot sub>ect 
o the provisions of any agreement between the Debtor or an> other party and LtUtr at the time m force to deal in any manner with the Liabilities and 
he collateral, including but without limiting the generaht> of the foregoing, the following power. 
„ , To modify or otherwise change anv terms of all or any part of the Liabilities or the rate of interest thereon (but not to increase the principal 
amount of the note of the Drbtor to Under • to grant aa* eatension or renewal thereof and any other indulgence with respect thereto and to 
effect any release compromise or settleiient with re«pect thereto, 
ib> To enter into anv agreement of forbearance with re-peet to all or any part of the Liabilities, or with respect to all or aav part of the collateral. 
and to change the term, of any such agreement, 
c» To forbear from calling for additional collateral to secure anv of the Liabilities or to secure any obligation comprised in the collateral, 
• d» To consent to the substitution esrhange or release of all or anv part t>( the collateraL whether or not the collateral if anv received by Lender 
upon any such substitution e.change or release shall be of 'he same or of a different character or value than the collateral surrendered hf 
Lender, 
• • In the event of the nonpavment when due whether bv acceleration or otherwise of any of the Liabilities, or in the event of default in the perform-
ance of any obligation comprised in the collateral to realite on the roUkteral or any part thereof as a whole or in such parcels or subdivided 
interests as Under may elect at an* public or private vale or sales for cash or on credit or for future delivery, without demand advertisement 
or notice of the time or p l a c of sale or an* adjournment thereof (the Undersigned herebv waiving anv such demand advertisement and notion to 
the ex ent permitted by law I or by foreclosure or otherwise or to forbeir from realizing thereon ail as lender in its uncontrolled discretion may 
deem proper and to purchase all or ao> part of the collateral for its owd account at any such sale or foreclosure, such powers to be esereised only 
to the eitent permitted by law 
The obligations of the Undersigned hereunder .hall not be released discharged or ta any way affected nor shall the Undersigned have any rights or 
recourse against Under by reason .>f any action Under may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers. 
In ease the Debtor shall fail to pay all or any part of the Liabilities when due whether by acceleration or otherwise according to the term, of said 
note the Undersigned, immediaury apoej the written demand of Under will pay to Under the amount due and unpaid bv the Debtor a. aforesaid m 
'ike manner a. if such amount constituted the direct and pnmarv obligation of the Lndersigned Under shall not be required pnor to any such demand oa, 
JT pavment by the Lndersigaed. ta make any demand upon or pursue or eibaust anv of its nghta or remedies against the Debtor or others with respect 
to the pavment of any of the Liabilities or ta pursue or eahaust any of its rights or remedies with respect to any part of the collateral The Lndersigned 
shall have no right of subrogation whatsoever with) respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unless and until Under shall have received full payment of ail 
the Liabilities. 
The obligations of the Lndersigned hereunder and the rights of Lender in the collateral shall not be released, discharged or m any way affected no* 
•hall the Undersigned have any ngbt. against Under by reason of the fact that any of the collateral mat be in default at the time of acceptance thereof 
b* Lender or later nor bv reason of the fact that a valid lien in anv of the collateral may not be conveyed to, or created in favor of Under, nor by reason 
of the fact that any of the collateral mev be subject to equities or defences or claims in favor af other, or may be invalid or defective in any way, nor by 
rci«on of the fact that any of the Liabilities mi* be invalid for <»r* rfa*on v*ha*»oe*er not bv reason of the fact that the value of any of the collateral or the 
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under »r g r a n t o r of an* of the collateral may not have been correctly estimated or may have changed 
or mav hereafter change, aor by reason of anv deterioration waste or loss b> fire theft, or otherwise ol any of the collateral, unless such deterioration, 
wtste, or was be caused by the willful aet or willful failure to act of Under 
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Lender or the holder of the aforesaid note of the Debtor upon demand but not more often than semiannually. 
*» 'ong as any pari of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid a financial statement aetting forth, in reasonable detail the a»sets, liabilities. 
and net worth ol the Undersigned. 
The Undersigned acknowledges and understand* that if the ^mall Busines* \dmmi«tration (^B\» enter* into has entered into or will enter into a 
Guaranty Agreement with Under or any other lending in«titution guaranteeing a portion of Debtors Liabilities, the Undemgned agrees that it is not a 
cogoarantor with ^BA and shall have no right oi contribution against *BA The I ndersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder •hall continue 
notwithstanding payment by SBA under it . Guaranty Agreement to the other lending institution. 
The term "Undersigned** as used in this acreement «hall mean the signer or signer* of this agreement, and such signers, if more than one shall be 
jo ntly and severally liable hereunder The U nderngned further agrees that all liability hereunder shall continue notwithstanding the incapacity lack of 
authority, death, or disability of any one or mnre of the Undersigned and that any failure by Under or its assigns to file or enforce a claim against the 
Mtate of any of the lnder«igned shall not operate to release any other of the Undersigned from liability hereunder The failure of any other person ta 
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect the liability of any signer hereof 
Sidney S^ftelx ^ 
NOTE.—Corporate guarantor* must eiecute gu< 
partnership guarantor, muit execute guaranty in fires name, together with signature of 
at the time of disbursement of loan. 
a ran ty in corporate name, by duly authorised officer, 
general partner 
.Qfiav. and ^seej^muat iff* aHietJ and duly attested; 
Formally eaecuted guaranty i. to be delivered 
(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATERAL SECURING THE GUARANTY) 
J5*£X!5£LJ».i \».I2. 
ta order to induce *5.?iL-5P/I-JQ*U?i.^Al..CJLtX—. 'hereinafter called "Lender") to make a loan or loans, or renewal or extension thereof, to 
(SBA or other Lending Institution* 
. ^ L ^ J ^ i ! ? ^ ? * * ? / . . ] : ! ? . . ^ . 1 ! ? / . ? J . h r m - h c r c . !W IW "D«b,o,"., ih , U d « . „ n , 
hereby unconditionally guarantees to Lender, its successor* and assigns, the due and punctual pavmcnt when due whether by accelerayoo or otherwise 
in accordaaca with the terms thereof, of the principal of and interest on and all other sums payable, or stated to be payable, witasvaetaettf o the note of th' 
Debtor, made by tn* Debtor to Lender, dated lZ^Z^.7% the principal amount of flQO,jQQO*i)0*ith interest at the rate of ^J£?S. per ren 
per annum. Such note, and the interest thereon and all other mma payable with respect thereto are hereinafter collectively caitat/f.iabiliciet ' \« secunt* 
for the performance of this guaranty the lndersigned hercb\ mortgages, pledges, assigns, transfers and delivers to Lender certain collateral tif any* listen 
in the schedule on the reverse side hereof The term 'collateral" as used herein shall mean any funds, guaranties, agreements or other property or runts or 
interests of any nature whatsoever, or the proceeds thereof which may have been. are. or hereafter mav be mortgaged, pledged, aligned, transferred or 
delivered directly or wdirectlv by or on behalf of the Debtor or the lndersigned or any other part* to Lender or to the bolder of the aforesaid note of the 
Debtor, or which may have been. are. or hereafter ma* be held b> any party as trustee or otherwise, as security whether immediate or underlying, for the 
(«rformaoce of this guaranty or the payment of the Liabilities or any of (hem or anv security therefor 
The L'aderstgned waives any notice of the incurring b% the Debtor at anv titne of anv of the Liabilities, and waives anv and all presentment, demand 
protest or notice of di«honor. nonpayment, or other default with respect to anv of the Liabilitie* and *n> obligation of any party at aay time comprised 
ia the collateraL The Undersigned hereby grants to Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the undersigned, but iub)eet 
to the provisions of anv agreement between the Debtor or anv other part* and Lender at the time in force, to deal in any manner with the Liabilities and 
ihe collateral, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following power* 
<af To modifv or otherwise change any terms of all or anv part of the Liabilities or the rate of m ere*f thereon «but not to increase the principal 
amount of the note of the Debtor to Lender), to grant any extension or renewal thereof and anv other indulgence with respect thereto and to 
effect any release, compromise or settlement with re*pect thereto, | 
'b> To enter into anv agreement of forbearance with re*fect to all or any pan of the Liabilities or with respect to all or any part of the collateral. 
and to change the terms of any such agreement; 
<c> To forbear from railing for additional collateral to secure any of the Liabilities or to *ecure anv obligation cr mpnsed in the collateral; 
<d» To consent to the substitution, exchange, or release of all or any pan of the collateral whether or not the collateral, if anv received bv Lender 
upon aay such substitution exchange, or release «ha)l be of the *ame or of a different cba-acter or value than the collateral surrendered bv 
Leader; 
<e» In the event of the nonpayment when due. whether b* acceleration or otherwise, of anv of the Liabilities or in the event of default in the perform 
ance of anv obligation comprised in the collateral, to realise on the collateral or anv part thereof as a whole or tn «uch parcels or subdivided 
interests as Lender mav elect, at anv public or private sale or sales, for clash or on credit or for future delivery without demand, advertisement 
or notice of the time or place of sale or any adjournment thereof <the Undersigned herebv waiving anv «uch demand advertisement and notice to 
the extent permitted by lawi, or by foreclosure or otherwise, or to forbear from realizing thereon all as Lender in its uncontrolled discretion mav 
deem proper, aad to purchase ail or any part of the collateral for its own account at anv «uch sale or foreclosure such powers to be exercised only 
to the extent permitted by law 
The obligations af the Undersigned hereunder shall not be released, discharged or in any way affected, nor shall the Lndersigned have any rights or 
recourse against Lender, by reason of any action Lender may take or omit to take under the foregoing powers 
la ease the Debtor shall fail ta pay all or any part of the Liabilities when due. whether bv acceleration or otherwt«e according to the terms of said 
note, the Undersigned, immediately upon the written demand of Lender, will pay to Lender the amount due and unpaid by the Debtor as aforesaid, ia 
like manner aa if such amount constituted the direct and primarv obligation of the Undersigned Lender shall not be required prior to any such demand on. 
or payment by, the Undersigned, to make any demand upon or pursue or exhaust anv of us rtcht* or remedies against the Debtor or others with respect 
to the payment of any of the Liabilities), or to pursue or exhaust anv of its rights or remedies with reject to anv part of the collateral The Undersigned 
shall have no nght of subrogation whatsoever with respect to the Liabilities or the collateral unle»* and until Lender shall have received full payment of all 
the Liabilities. 
The obligations of the lnder«igned hereunder, and the right* of Lender tn the collateral *hall not be released divhareed or m anv way affected nor 
shall the Undersigned have any rights against Lender bv reason of the fact that anv of the collateral mav be in default at the time of acceptance thereof 
bv lender or tater; nor by rea«on of the fact that a valid lien tn anv of the collateral mav not be conveved to. or created in favor of Lender, nor by reason 
of the fact that any of the collateral mav be subject to equities or defenses or claims in favor of ethers or mav be invalid or defective in any way; nor by 
reason of the fact thai any of the L:abilitie« mav be invalid for am reason whatsoever, nor bv rrj*«,n of the 'act that the value of anv of the collateraL or the 
financial condition of the Debtor or of anv obligor under or guarantor of anv of the collateral, mav not have been correctlv estimated or may have changed 
or may hereafter change; nor by reason of any deterioration, waste or loss by fire, theft, or otherwise of any of the collateral. unles« such deterioration, 
waste, or loss be caused by the willful act or willful failure to act of Lender. | 
The Undersigned agrees to furnish Lender, or the bolder of the afore«aid note of the Debtor upon demand, but not more often than <emiannual!v. 
so long as any part of the indebtedness under such note remains unpaid, a financial statement netting forth in reasonable detail, the assets, liabilities, 
and net worth of the Undersigned. 
The Undersigned acknowledges and understands thai if the ^mall Business Administration «CB*.» enter* into ha« entered into, or will enter into, a 
Guarantv Agreement with Lender or aay other lending institution guaranteeing a portion of Debtor* Liabilities the i nd»r<igned agrees that it i« not a 
d'guaraaior with hBA and shall have no nght of contribution jgain«t *BA The t nder«igned further agree*, that all Iiabtlitv hereunder shall continue 
notwithstanding pavment by SBA under it« Guarantv Agreement to the other fending {institution. 
The teem "Undersigned" as used in this agreement •hall mean the signer or *tgn|er» of thi* agreement, and *ueh signers, if more than one. shall be 
join'lv and severally liable hereunder The Undersigned further agrees that all liability hereunder «hall continue notwithstanding the incapacity lack i f 
authority, death, or disability of any one or more of the Undersigned, and that anv failure bv Lender or its aliens to file or enforce a claim against the 
estate of any of the Undersigned shall not operate to release any other of the Lndersigned from liability hereunder ^The failu/r^if anv o j j ^ oervon t^o 
sign this guaranty shall not release or affect the liability of any signer hereof. 
NOTE.—Corporate guarantors must execute guaranty in corporate name, by duly authorised officer, and seal must be affixed and duly attested: 
partnership guarantors must execute guaranty in firm name, together with signature of a geaerai partner. Formally executed guaranty is ta be delivered 
at the time of disbursement of loaa. 
(LIST ON REVERSE SIDE COLLATER4L SECIRI.NC THE GUARANTY) 
SBA FORM tea) <1-7S> « K F SOS* 70 50 USC i-71 e O l T i Q N U N T I L E X H A U S T E D \ J ( J {J J ^ J ^ 
March 30. 1983 
Capital City Bank, (the Bank), agrees to modify the terms of the loan agree* 
ment dated December 24, 1979, between the Bank aud Bagel Nosh Intermountain Ltd., 
Inc., (the Borrower), under the following conditions: 
I 
1. The Borrower agrees to bring all accrued interest current on March 
30, 1983. Accrued interest on March 30, 1983, will be $15,937.61. 
If the Borrower makes the payment of $5,557.50 on March 25, 1983, as 
specified in the loan agreement now in effect, all of which will be 
applied to interest, then the amount of accrued interest due will be 
$10,380.11. 
i 
2. The Borrower agrees to reduce the principal amount of the loan by 
$2,746.09, leaving a principal balance of S296,000.00. 
3. The Borrower agrees to provide signed monthly operating statements 
and balance sheets to the Bank until all indebtedness to the Bank is 
paid in full. The Borrower will provide the statements within 30 
days of the end of each month. 
4. The Borrower agrees to provide evidence of continuous insurance cover-
age on all collateral assigned to the Bank to secure the loan until 
the loan is paid in full. If insurance on any of the collateral lapses 
or is cancelled, then the loan may be accelerated. 
5. Sidney Seftel and Michael Landes personally guarantee the Bank's loan 
to the Borrower. Each is personally liable for the entire indebtedness 
to the Bank. Each agrees to provide the Bank by February 28th of each 
year a current personal financial statement as specified in the loan 
agreement dated December 24, 1*79. 
6. Any item in the loan agreement dated December] 24, 1979, that is not 
specifically modified by this loan restructure agreement remains in 
full force. 
7. The Bank agrees to lower the Borrower's monthly payment from $5,557.50 
per month to $4,000.00 per month for a period of one year as long as 
interest is paid in full each month and principal is reduced by a 
minimum of $500.00. If the payment does not cover interest in full 
and a minimum principal reduction of $500.00 each month, then the 
Borrower will increase the payment at least by the amount of interest 
not covered and by a minimum of $500.00 to reduce principal. The 
Borrower understands that if the rate in effect on March 30, 1983, 
were to remain in effect until December 24, 1987, and that if the 
payment of $4,000.00 were to be made each month, then the principal 
amount due and payable on December 24, 1987, would be approximately 
$230,000.00. 
8. The Bank agrees to reduce the increment over ttae prime rate from 2.75 
percent to 2.25 percent adjusted quarterly. The prime rate will be 
that then in effect at the Bank on January 1, April 1, July 1, and 
October 1, of each year until December 24. 19R7-
Dated this 30th day of March, 1983. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK BAGEL NOSH INTERMOUNTAIN LTD., INC. 
By: ^ _^Vifc_> %MP»: ^J^*. . £ '4f* 
C / 
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FIRST VARIABLE RATE FUND 
By; Byj 
occurs 
OMnefael J. Sapcntain (XS61) 
Karen C. Jensen (1680) 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant, Capital City Bank 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, ) 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah ] 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
xrcf 
V S . 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
' 
AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM 
* 
< 
_» 
5 
in 
> 
Id Z 
TO
R 
\-
< 
h 
y 
u 
rr h 
U) 
7 
< i 
I 
1 
O (A 
O 
n 
of 
O 
O 
T 
K-
U. 
_J 
y 
_ r* 
<\j 
j ^ 
O 
* CO 
I 
< H 
J 
y 
\r 
U 
td 
* 
< 
H 
_» < 0) 
STATE OF UTAH 
If COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :ss. 
f Si 
z 0 
< i 
M 0
 t in D 
9 >' 
n I-
0 ui 
k < 
-
1
 < 
) 
M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter 
"Capital City"), the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding, 
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
3. As Executive Vice President of Capital City, I am responsible for 
supervising the maintenance of the books and records (including both accounting records 
and loan files with correspondence) of that institution (hereinafter "Books and Records") 
and am the custodian of the Books and Records. 
4. The Books and Records are maintained by several employees of Capital 
City on a daily basis, are audited by a firm of certified public accountants, and are 
examined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which insures the deposits 
of Capital City. 
5. Entries in the Books and Records are [made at or near the occurrence 
of each entry or event. 
6. Each entry is made and recorded by ari employee of Capital City having 
knowledge of the facts to be entered and which employee has a duty to record as 
part of her or his employment with Capital City. 
7. Each entry made in the Books and Records is made in the regular course 
of the business activity of Capital City. 
8. Each entry is recorded in the ordinary course of the business activity 
of Capital City. 
t - wmmm TrT»-nfiiiO U M Books and Records relative to the loan which 
is the subject of the above-captioned proceeding. 
10. The loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd. (hereinafter 
"Bagel Nosh"), was made purusant to Part 101 of the Rules and Regulations of the 
Small Business Administration, an agency of the United States of America (hereinafter 
"SBA"). 
11. SBA is a participating lender in the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh 
to the extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance. 
12. On March 30, 1983, the loan of Capital City to Bagel Nosh was in default 
for failure of Bagel Nosh (and Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes, 
plaintiffs herein and personal guarantors of the obligation of Bagel Nosh) to make 
the payments required under the terms of the note (and absolute, unconditional, 
personal guaranties among other reasons. 
13. Pursuant to a Loan Restructure Agreement (Exhibit 6 to the Answer 
and Counterclaim of Capital City) executed on or about March 30, 1983, the defaults 
of Bagel Nosh and its personal guarantors were cured. 
14. On November 29, 1984, Bagel Nosh filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
15. During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, from approximately 
Novmeber 29, 1984, through December 27, 1985, reduced monthly payments on the 
obligation of Bagel Nosh to Capital City were made by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, 
and Michael S. Landes as guarantors through their attorneys. 
16. Since at least January 25, 1986, the obligations of Bagel Nosh under 
the note and the obligations of Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael S. Landes 
under their personal guaranties have been in default for failure to make payments 
as provided in those instruments or as modified. 
Wtmjmim^'pmt& or cfttwrwf**, hmx* been made on the note of 
i in favor of Capital City since December 27,1985. 
18. The amount due to Capital City from Bagel Nosh, Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael S. Landes pursuant to the note and absolute, unconditional, personal 
guaranties as of March 31, 1986, is $265,848.07 plus accruing interest at the rate 
of 11.75 percent per annum plus accruing costs and attorneys1 fees. 
19. No comments or complaints either formal or informal have been made 
by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes to Capital City, or its employees 
or agents, relative to the Loan Restructure Agreement of March 30, 1983, until the 
complaint was filed in the above-captioned action. 
I 
20. At no time prior to the complaint, filed in the above-captioned 
proceeding, have Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, or Michael S. Landes made written 
representations or notice to Capital City of the sale or other disposition of the 
equipment of Bagel Nosh in which Capital City has an interest. 
21. According to the Books and Records, no representations have been 
made by Capital City, its agents or employees, to Crossroads Plaza Associates or 
its agents or employees, that Capital City did not have or does not have an interest 
in the personal property or equipment of Bagel Nosh. 
DATED this day of July, 1986. 
Z%-4~s&ig-
M.A. Allem 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J j ^ d a y of July, 1986. 
Notary Public, residing at 
4 t J 4 LC\k&- County, Utah 
My commission expires: 
i*t*wmm*0, 
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t i t 3ookl» Haiti, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-1310 
(Judge Hanson) 
CAPITAL CITY BANK'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WS§* Wmk DfartllMlf f *X:*plUd CitVlt by and through its counsel, 
Wattles & Qunptell, files this memorandum in redly to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
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H Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and pursuant to leave of 
this Court granted by the Honorable Scott Daniels pursuant to an Order dated October 
2, 1986, which also continued the hearing in this matter to October 27, 1986, at 2:30 
p.m. Plaintiffs (Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and ^Michael Landes) may be referred 
to herein collectively as "Guarantors." 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ^ACTS 
1. Capital City is the holder of all loan instruments relating to the Bagel 
Nosh loan including the Note executed by Bagel Nbsh in favor of Capital City on 
December 24, 1979 (Exhibit 1 to Capital CityTs Memorandum), and the guaranty 
agreements of even date executed by each of the Guarantors. [Supplemental Affidavit 
of M.A. Allem previously filed with this Court and a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 17] 
2. The Guarantors have admitted that they are personally liable on the 
Note in favor of Capital City and that the guaranties have continuing effectiveness 
in the "Disclosure Statement by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan" dated October 
8, 1985, which includes the "Plan of Reorganization by Proponents" dated October 
8, 1985, which they have filed in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy proceeding and certified 
copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit 18. 
ARGUMENT 
The Guarantors are the only parties responding in writing to Capital CityTs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. They assert tha* genuine issues of material fact 
exist precluding the availability of summary judgment. The Guarantors' memorandum 
asserts three points comprising four issues which arep (1) factual issues exist relative 
the Guarantors; (3) Capital City failed to join an indispensable party; and (4) Capital 
City's recovery should be limited to Capital City's participation in the Note. Each 
of the issues is addressed herein. 
POINT I 
THE GUARANTORS ADMIT THE CONTINUING 
VITALITY OF THEIR GUARANTIES 
The Guarantors have alleged that actions of Capital City on or about October 
31, 1981, and in February 1985, discharged their liabilities under the guaranties. 
However, the legal documents filed by the Guarantors in the Bagel Nosh bankruptcy 
proceeding in referring to payment of Capital City explicity state that Capital City 
will be "retaining the personal guarantors on the loan." See, Disclosure Statement 
by Proponents of the Reorganization Plan, p. 26 (attached as Exhiibit 18). That 
document is dated October 8, 1985, and signed by counsel for the Guarantors. Thus, 
the liability has been expressly admitted or there has been an express waiver or consent 
to any modifications in addition to all other arguments previously advanced by Capital 
City. 
POINT II 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS 
The Guarantors concede the applicability of federal law to this action. In 
order to ascertain if a genuine issue of material fact exists the law of the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals must be applied. 
To support their position, the Guarantors rely primarily upon dictum in United 
States v. Abbruzzese, 553 F.Supp. 11, 13 (E.D.Mich.1982) interpreting the "deterioration 
clause" of the Form 148 guaranty. That Court states its opinion that its interpretation 
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Joe Beaston Tractor dc Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196 
(10th Cir. 1957) upon which case the Guarantors also rely. However, the Joe Heaston 
Tractor case did not deal with a Form 148 guaranty. Nor have the Guarantors cited 
any authority where any court has ruled against the lender under a Form 148 guaranty. 
Furthermore, after the 1982 Abbmzzese opihion, the "deterioration clause," 
now relied upon by the Guarantors, has been interpreted by the Tenth Circuit earlier 
this year in United States v. New Mexico Landscaping, Inc., 785 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 
1986). The Tenth Circuit stated: 
Therefore, in order to establish a 'willful act or willful failure to act / 
by the [lender] under the guaranty agreement, a guarantor must allege 
more than Tgross neglect of a known duty.1 A guarantor seeking to 
establish 'willfulness1 under this guaranty agreement must allege fa 
purpose by the [lender] to diminish the value of the security in order 
to intentionally injure the [guarantors].1 785 F.2d at 848 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuits language is dispositive of this case. 
No allegation of the complaint alleges any purpose by Capital City "to diminish 
the value of the security in order to intentionally injure" the Guarantors. Indeed, 
any allegation of that nature is highly improbable since the alleged loss arises from 
execution on a default judgment against a corporation (in which the Guarantors are 
the principals) which judgment arose from a suit lin which the Guarantors were 
I 
co-defendants and who chose to answer the complaint on their own behalves but 
permitted a default judgment to be entered against their corporation. Having failed 
to set forth any allegations and provide any evidence of the "willfulness" requirement, 
summary judgment against the Guarantors is appropriate. Accordingly, the Guarantor's 
causes of action should be dismissed with prejudice. 
IB 
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THE GUARANTORS EXPRESSLY CONSENTED TO 
MODIFICATION OF THE NOTE 
The Guarantors persist in their assertion that material modifications in the 
Note discharged their obligations although their argument is in their memorandum 
under the heading relative to willful loss of the collateral. At page nine (9) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors allege material alterations were made to the Note, 
including extension of the term, without the consent of the Guarantors. However, 
there was NO extension of the terms of the loan. The alterations were a reduction 
of both the interest rate and the monthly payment. Further, on page ten (10) of their 
memorandum, the Guarantors suggest in a non-sensical phrase that Capital City has 
conceded some point and that there is no allegation that the Guarantors, in their 
individual capacities, consented to any alterations. 
To be clear, Capital City has not conceded anything. Further, Capital City 
reiterates its position stated in Point II at page fourteen (14) of its memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment and emphatically articulates that 
the Guarantors, in their individual capacities, expressly consented in the guaranty 
agreements to any and all modifications to the Note thereby waiving any and all rights 
which they might have been able to assert. 
Capital City also has provided additional information and argument which 
(as the Guarantors have recognized) supports a position that notwithstanding the 
express waiver there has been an implicit consent to the modifications or waiver 
of their rights. See also Point I, supra. 
Two of the cases cited by the Guarantors with reference to the alterations 
are inapposite. Sauder v. Dittmar, 118 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1941) is an old Tenth Circuit 
opinion which does not even deal with guaranties. Tomlin v. Ceres, 507 F.2d 642 
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the guarantor which is the issue 1 « gwffftfttor but does not address a specific waiver by 
in this case. 
The other two cases relied upon the Guarantors actually support the position 
of Capital City. In Depositors Trust Co. v. Hudson General Corp., 485 F.Supp. 1355 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), the guaranty specifically required the lender to give notice to the 
guarantor of any modification and to obtain his consent thereto. The lender failed 
to give notice or obtain the guarantors consent. Thus, the guarantor was discharged 
of his liability. Notice is specifically and expressly waived in the guaranty agreements 
executed by the Guarantors and which are at issue befqre this Court. 
Finally, F.D.I.C. v. Manion, 712 F.2d 295 (7th| Cir. 1983), involved a guaranty 
in which the guarantor expressly consented to modifications of the principal note 
I 
but also provided a means for the guarantor to revok^ his continuing guaranty. After 
revocation of the guaranty, the lender extended thd Note and after default sought 
to recover from the guarantor. The CourtTs opinion acknowledges that a consent 
in the guaranty waives the guarantors right to object to a modification or alteration. 
In that particular case the alteration occurred after revocation, effectively discharging 
the guarantor since the Court interpreted the waiver to apply only to extension or 
modification of the Note prior to revocation of the guaranty. Implicit in the Seventh 
Circuit's reasoning is if the extension had occurred pridr to revocation of the guaranty, 
the guarantor would have remained liable since the guaranty agreement waived the 
rights of the guarantor. 
In this case, the Guarantors have explicitly Consented to the modifications. 
The guaranties state that the Guarantors grant: 
[T]o Lender full power, in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice 
. . . to deal in any manner with the liabilities and the collateral, includingT 
but without limiting the generality of the foregoilng, the following powers: 
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any extension or renewal thereof . . . and to effect any release, 
compromise, or settlement with respect thereto. 
There is no provision in the guaranties for revocation as in the Manion case relied 
upon by the Guarantors. If the Manion court had been faced with the facts of this 
case, it is apparent that the guarantors would not have been discharged since the 
guaranty agreements provide an explicit consent to the modification of the Note 
without notice. 
POINT IV 
SBA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
The Guarantors last two arguments are that the SBA is an indispensable party 
having a ninety percent (90%) interest in the Note and guaranties, and, therefore, 
Capital City's recovery should be limited to ten percent (10%) of the outstanding 
balance. Those arguments are meritless. 
The general law concerning a party in interest is not available in the context 
of negotiable instruments nor is the relationship between SBA and Capital City a 
partnership as the Guarantors assert. The holder of a negotiable instrument has the 
right to sue on the note regardless of actual ownership. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-3-301 (1980). The obligor under the instrument is protected when the holder 
of the instrument is paid since payment to the holder discharges the obligation. See, 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-603 (1980). In this case, Capital City is the holder of the 
legal instruments, is entitled to collect the Note through suit or otherwise, and is 
entitled to recovery thereon. 
Furthermore, a participant to a loan is not an indispensable party since its 
claims are only against the note holder (lead lender) as to its pro rata portion of the 
proceeds and does not have a direct claim against the obligor. Hibernia National 
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even a participation* SBA has agreed to participate in the loan to the extent of ninety 
percent (90%) of the outstanding debt when certalin conditions are satisfied. The 
loan was fully funded by Capital City, and SBA h$s not yet purchased any portion 
of the debt. Consequently, the interest of SBA is only as a potential participant, 
and at this point, SBA is not entitled to any proceeds t^ > be recovered. 
All parties necessary to a complete resolution of the issues before this Court 
have been joined. Capital City, as the holder of the instruments, is entitled to summary 
judgment for the full amount of the outstanding obligation plus applicable costs 
including attorneys* fees incurred. 
that no genuine issue of material 
this case is ripe for summary 
CONCLUSION 
Capital City has met its burden of establishing I 
fact exists under the applicable law. Accordingly, 
judgment which should be entered in favor of Capital City and against each of the 
Counterclaim Defendants including Plaintiffs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 day of October, 1986. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
*4sar 
^V77Uj£ 
^Steven T. 
Attorneys 
Waterman 
for Capital City Bank 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *) day of October, 1986, I served the foregoing 
Capital City Bank's Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as shpwn below: 
[JACKSON A WILKINSON 
Arrow Press Square, Suite 200 
165 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kent W. Larsen 
Thomas B. Green 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil B. Smith 
P.O. Box 25728 
336 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Mary Beth Walls, Assistant Attorney General 
23 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Douglas Mortenson 
MATHESON, JEPPSON & MORTENSON 
658 East 180 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
UJ -
z O 
3 
0 
I 
y 
< 
< 
T.WMmM(41t4> 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant, Capital City Bank 
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SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
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Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
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general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-1810 
(Judge Hansen) 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF M.A. ALLEM 
STATE OP tTTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
y -
u N 
01 • 
< 2 CD 
5 s i 
(A IA D 
y 2 >* 
Z « H 
o « G 
M.A. Allem, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Executive Vice President of Capital City Bank (hereinafter 
"Capital City") the Defendant and Counterclaimant in the above-captioned proceeding 
and am authorized by Capital City to execute this affidavit. 
2. This affidavit supplements the affidavit filed in this action and executed 
by myself on the 17th day of July, 1986. 
3. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
4. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the agreement executed 
between Capital City and the Small Business Administration of the United States 
of America (hereinafter "SBA") entitled "Loan Guaranty Agreement (Deferred 
Participation)" commonly known as SBA Form 750 executed on September 20, 1978, 
by Capital City and SBA (hereinafter "SBA Participation Guaranty"). 
5. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the SBA Participation Guaranty, Capital 
City is the holder of all loan instruments, which in this case includes the note executed 
by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., on December 24, 1979, which is Exhibit 1 to the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Capital City and the Guaranty 
Agreements trf even date executed by Sidney-Seftel and Theresa L. Seftel and Michael 
S. Landes attached as Exhibits 4 and 6 respectively to Capital City's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, and until those instruments are transferred to SBA, Capital 
City is entitled to sue upon the loan instruments including acceleration of the maturity 
of the note and guaranties provided Capital City has obtained the written consent 
of SBA. 
*• Capital City is the legal holder of j the note and guaranties involved 
in this action, and Capital City has not transferred the note or guaranties to SBA 
and has been authorized in writing by SBA to sue upon the note and guaranties and 
accelerate the maturity thereof. 
DATED t h i s ^ J ^ S a y of September, 1986. 
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M.A. Allem 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this l ^ M d a y of September, 1986. 
-~vwy^ (kLjAAAt-
Notary Public residing at 
^IUJ- 1/tJr / County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
A C K f E M B C T . a * * * * • E O t * i** of S e p t 6 « b € r
 f I 9 l ? b r and s e v e e r . 
C a p i t a l C U y Bank . Z200 S o . S t a t e S t . , S a l t l a k e C i t y , Utah P A H : 
(Lender's name and full address ; 
and Small B u s i n e s s Administration (SBA) , an agencv ot the United States Government. 
t H F . R E A S . cne parties intend tor Lender to make and SBA to guaraotee loans tc small Bus ines s concern? 
pursuant to the Small B u s i n e s s A c : , a s amended, and Ti t le V oi tne Small b u s i n e s s Investment Ac:, as amende: : 
N O t . THEREFORE, tne n a m e * agree as follow*-: 
1. Application for Guaranty. Tht« agreement shal l cover onlv loans duly approved hereafter to: guaranty bv 
Lenoer atxc 5BA subiec t to SBA's Rules and Regulat ions aa promulgated trorn time to t ime. Any loan approved oy 
Lenoer contingent upon SBA's guarunrv under this .^ teement shal l be referred to SBA for authorization upon tne 
separate apoi irat ion* of L e n i e * »nd tnr loan appl icant . 
2. Appro vol of Guaranty. SBA shall either approve in a formal loan authorization or dec l ine (he guaranty by 
written not ice to the Lender. Prior to full disbursement ot the loan, aoy change in the terms or condit ion* stated in 
the l~>an authorization shall be subtect to prior written agreement between SBA and Lender. 
3. C los ing or.d Disburse* an* a* Loons . Lf-n^-r *hal! c l o s e and disburse each loan in accordance with the terms 
and condit ion* oi the upproied '.••ar. authonza:: -*ri. I -r..ie» shal l cause to be e s e c u t e d a note* and al! additional 
instruments anc ' ike «ucr othe* >-^>r.s wh.rr sha' : , wonsisrent with prudent c l o s i n g p r a c t i c e s , 't>e required in order 
fully to protect o- preserve the ir.;eres:s of Lender »nd SBA in the loan. Immediately after the first disbursement of 
e a c h loan. Lender shal l furnish SBA with a copy of the e s e c u t e d note , sett lement sheet* and compensat ion agreement* 
and guaranty fee mentioned tn pa.tgraph * hereot I.rmei »:e!v following any subsequent d i sbursement s , Lender shal l 
furnish SBA with ar. eaecu .ed «e»T*.eT»en: sheet.* ^BA shall be entit led at am t ime, after wnr:eo notice to esamine 
and obtain c o p . e s of all n o t e s , securi ty agreements , instruments of hypothecat ion , al1 other agreements ana documents 
hrretn collectively called " I r a n \n%::vmem»** •, *,o«r The lasr. :r;ayneBi recotds held by Lender which relate to Joa/ia 
rraie ru-suant to this agreement. 
4. ff £ t o r « •* t?o«v%. leniet * h a l ! c r t m p ' e . e and \ : % a r d t c S B * a w r i t t e n , c a r t e r ! } - S - . * * J S ; e p o r t . * T>.i* report 
h a t ! Se c^* ^ rh n 2C :.*?• «,:'re- t h e ? n i of rhe r e e f i n g ; e r i > d s p e c i f i e d ir the r e p o r t . r PA « - » ! ! r>o: re : > ' jr*:ed 
re p j . * c * ; s ? v » _ -r.i*ed ; .e;ce**.;age ai the o u : :--*£»<!-tig h * 7 a n c e of :he l o a n u S B A i t : » ' T - n e * - h a : L c r d e r ' s 'a i 'u . -e 
:r, ?-£*'• i* •' •';. .:-• •* a c - u r a t e s r s r u f in'or:? a t ! on c a u s e d a n y s u b s t a n t i a ! harm tc the ;",,;•. e -- ment:. 
5. t v • I- '; r ; *• * *•'••- ' ^ a ! * : *y -r ?* .\ a .<r.a^I«n« g u a r a n t y f e e a m o u n t i n g to o n e ,"e:r«»n- cf the •>:•'. »r ;;t 
. * ' » * • • - : '. : n * . . ~f j - ;?- . :> f e e :\i\% l-e r a i d w i t h i n 9C d a y s of t h e d a t e of the b i t * i . p r - v » ' .-.:*• e c - h i • m 
•
 ;
 -r -• ' •- '* •"-'«• f*.e r. -' - a : j TV , v .. fv« v T . e ; e : . ' o d , S B A w i l l s e n d ' h e L e n U e : a « - i : : e r . r ; . : . c t » i ! c h *<.!! 
*te V J V* _ -.:;. - y j, ' - ar . •*•:!' b e : e r ~ . ' ; . a t e d if S B A d o e a not r e c e i v e t h e f e e wi th ir . th< • T»C - : . - - ' e . ie 
• re »• "- •• » **' r
 t < 3-.*y :«n t h i s ! r a p r.ay h e .-eir.'s.rared by ? B A at ; rs s H e d i s c e : . . ' > r , r u : s - » n : tc - . . ' . ; ? , ' . t -
' i - h e d by ^ B - T T h e J W e r a ! R e g i s t e r . TT.e; - w ! l ' b e r.c r e h a t e r»; •>.? g u a r . - i t y f e e a: s n y t e e -r. »s«. h e " . . ? - . - • • "• *s 
:<->• - .* . :» .-.:•} i . ' . :•• n* ••? . h e g a t .s . - .c .vi ' ••r#*'»c .*- . r s t s a ; f . r r . o ; 'S-. f r c . ^ - rr e r w i ' h . a.*.-:*''.!:'^:. J 'Ve 
? .^n .-. w t h t ' z a - i . - n . A r r * p t » n < e o l t h -
 ft..«.*r:ty f e e by v ? A s h a l l nvt c • -« . ; . - . . .* J : . : * , . * - e . .•;. S I ; * o ; ^n; " - ^ ' i . c ? 
or i«..h-r rr i s : ' r a r n n c e •>. ' h e ; art of he ! r ; ? : . r r / r : i >. . tee ;'e? .-r-al: V*P :•'% i Sy T . ? l « - n : e r 4nc r.nt by t h ; r J ; : _ - X r r . 
I. 4 < J m i « ; 4 f o t o n c ' L '• ?ns . !-• .Ie* r -:!' h ',' * ^ r T u * • _ • - " « , .-•; '• !^ •* . c '.v» al" ; »•. : cr».f r*.' p - i i i c . r a l 
-r»tf i ; r . e - ? s * .. f;" • • Ke r u . f tr - F *.. H • i e * o^ '**.• -,k»te ' L e n d e r or **?A - M . . r.r-* * : .>•-: r - ' *'<-:»r c . .i-
i e n t n: -.hr ~ - h e r . '; L: •- ".>*-?•. • a.-.*. ..'•••;'• ••' j ' - r r ? * or. ; v ? - - • _r •• \ '. --* " -• -->:"• .'• * • > . ' : « ! " 
• : - ; ' - :r .?* v J* i? "!.•' * •• * f *.-, ! - - ? - ; « -r p"-r.^.;r. ' ^ n : jr s u r e s * •.•.'.? •*• -.-.•• > " .-r. " *' * *. r ' . r « :•• ...".'• s a 
rre:e: : »r .Ci .-n the '. . . f ' . ' b • i'*.? . • ' • :>* -f r.t ic - •. : . fer of : . ! ! . ' : t ; i . h i ' i r i a ..." »:.••'. * . . . ? -: *. - - :b 'y 
i*:«•:.•? ».7»J bj ' h e s '»>• •_>; v - ' . ' c , l - .s - „:; ' S n ? r - . e - : * n : of the c V - i * . ' '. •' 'r.-.nr, :' * ' . . : '* : :» : • -he 
* -*^- i i ) : . .*:; n •.\r ' j "
 fc-r # .- *r.y ' j r T r . v - . T . - n ; , or ,'e* w a . v e *n% »*'• r -*.« . ;r >r> : - • : / • • - r ' r » t , 
v
" . o : .;.- »•:. . .Ji-j . ^ c : > : -' " ' f "u» oi any ' .r !-»- :••;-'. nt . A!! , . - - v . - £ u n i o n s s h a l l b e the ."• .•"*.'.•.'. w .:' ;i^e 
'-*!:!-: ^V s-.*»' f •»"...» i.- . ; . '! . * ; s : ' * tr j»;-*- ic 'rg * n j ' l ^ y f j Vj ; > ; j i e n t ,.*nd'-r«- / - r t f - s ' l j , » . e ; . ; , a t 
' . • - — • : s . : ; " A : : * « • > " • ? * ' . , - . . ->.*•.•»•. . . . - . *gu!a: .C'&* v'!? C . F . R . , Par? 1 1 ; ' « - » ! ! r< * - - i e c : • . • . ; : - > o 
« . - :e l> L-y S" 3 4 . . 
7
. P . ?'• . : • - « ; " ? V t ' '.*• - . 1 ; i / - w : ' £ - h j - rF.A p u r c h a s e rhe £ - a : *;»;<€-. : -.:: .-r: :.^t of ;h? r^a:-
••'. - •'••r.t : 3 ' ?•*•:• f.i *'.e ' ir .? .'«•'.»•/.•. ^ ^ • ' • • » : • . • ' • : ' . . - je« c i c u x e d f c»r m^re than 6 0 d a y s (or l e s s , it S B A 
.•v., . ' r f ; • : • , -n) .: , • ." ; ;" ! . : .»" ;~:''K i : a l or i n t e r e s t o r «ny n o t e . Bv m a k i n g w r i t t e n d e * 
•.
v
-.i
 t . i • • • ' . ? : ; . ( • • >' r: a ' . a n , I ? n d e r s h a ! ! be a e e m e d t h e r e s y t o cirrtify t h a t the l e a n n a s 
i e-r! ir ' . - ; ' a n c : » r.^ . • > > -^.-cr :j«_n: and ;hat t h i s a g r e e m e n t r -mainsr in fu l l f o r c e and 
? '. •'•'•'* r '" f . : •»"-.: ' - c e i r - of V e - . J e r ' s d e m a n d , t o g e t h e r w i t h a c e r t i f i e d t r a n s c r i p t 
:'** .: .. :•.-."*.• y v * • -• !-.>• . r t r . r s , v ' ' * c o u : r e c o u r s e , S B A w i l ' Piiy to L e n d e r the g u a r -
x
 *.' .. * . ' :-.•-: ' .: ; c • •* . f j ' .::?;?$: <«: th* note rate, afrer adiusiment for other thar^es , 
.'•• .? ff '.. • « • . • * -.-r' *i ^i? of r . i t;rs:* *>i:'eT'cing the percentage of loac retained by the 
:r *: I :--.ts: st.ay c • '.,-ut ' ^ ' - i s t r a . i ^ n jf the '.can after S9A purchases :r.e g>arAf»teed 
! '?''.ver re r P* . »; : • •' .-• of j . . - r h s s « conforrr.ed cop ies of any ot the Loan Instruments not 
•. iM'* : s - - e tt » ? ' . a c - r t - ' i r u e ;^ i.-.:e:rst* •'"iu'^n^mc i B A ' s r-ercrtitsge of the loan. Pu; -
* i've &r.y *
 eh* 'f :-FA ar«.'r.g *.cm Lrodtf'.- n r c l i ^ e n c e , «rsc-T-dact, or *i;!a*i«n ot any 
f nz. 
8. F e e s a» Co;-..*'s s'-ort. * eriJer sha:! no: require cert i f icates of deposi t or compensating ba lances and shai i not 
directly or i:.i'.'t-ct!y .ha-^e :r rece ive aoy bonus , f e e , cr»cr.rtssion or other payment ar benefit io connect ion with 
making or s e : v l c > £ ir.y KMH, eacvpt teimburseri.«nt for charges or e i p e n s e s incuired or compensat ion for actual 
service*, rendered. 
t . Scoring df Repe>rr.av)t P r o t f e d s and CoMstarol. Lender shal ! not acquire any preferential secur i ty , surety ot 
Insurance to protect its -ng. srameed interest in a loan. All repayments , security ot guaranty of aoy nature, including 
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I t . SftA ^vrdMH Pr»*»"U©«. Notwithstanding am provision or anv agreement between SBA and Lenae:. SBA r.x? 
the absolute rigor a: any time tc purcnase its guarantees percentage o: ant ioan in the interest of the Government or 
the borrower. ¥ith»n 1* aavs of the Lender's receipt oi SBA's vltitten aemanc :o purchase the guaranteed percentage. 
Lender shall deliver ro SBA • certifies t-an*cnp: ot" the '.oar. account showing date and amount o: each advance or 
disbursement ana repayment and shal. assign and de;iver to SBA tne Lear, instruments pursuant to paragraph * aoov-. 
I".pot* receipt of these documents, SBA shall pav Lender the eulranreec portion oi tne amount men owing on the .oar. 
pursuant to paragraph " aocve. | 
i 
12. Assignment of Interest ir» Loon. A. Eitner party may assjign, if. whole or part, its rtgnts or obligations un-er rh:s 
agreement or anv guaranteed .oar. »uh tne prior written consent jot the otner parrv including rransiers pursuant tc 
>econaari Participation Agreements rl> C.F.R. Part 120 §l20.5faV>V. B. Nothing in th:s agreement prohions. upc*r. 
wfirien nonce to SBA, assignment bv the Lenaer lot holder of th|e Note) to other banking institutions pro*»ded •! ;ne 
Lender retains an unguaranteed interest of no: less than K percent of the outstanding pnccies: amount of :n? .*ar.. 
• 2) SBA may continue to deaS sotetv with tne Lender as to the entire loan and [} • assignee shall have nc ^ ' - a t c :.inr< 
man assignor.C. Nothing in this agreement prohibits Lender, without notice rcSBA rrom usmcany gua'ar.-.eec: < *r a 
security for (1) Treasury Ta» and Loan Accounts <Treasury Department Circular 92), '*'• the deposit of public rune*. 
\l) uninvested trust fund*, or M» discount ootrowmgs «t che Federal Reserve Pack, provided a Lender nas nor sole 
or otherwise assigned any part or the guaranteed loan, and (bN Lender retains full authority to perform its responsr* 
bilities under this agreement. 
13. Termination. | 
cu Either part> rr.av rermnate this agreement upon not ielss tran If oavs *ri:;en notice oy certi ' ?c Tia:. re 
the other parry. Termination srai . not afreet tn* guaranr\ ot *ny tear r:?v r^sit authorized ov *BA. Tr.n K * . : r i » 
grapn is no: applicaM* *tere tr.is agreement applies omy tc uneLj*» gr.atec ooirower. 
fc» Lender m-y : • • - ' . • e the gu* anrv as u any -jras«.^ned -^ar g-.»i»nteed hereunder at anv time ptiot *c 
purchase by SPA a: on nonce »c SBA. ""\e ^uarant* or any i:<r. >h»T ;>e :*'T.;na:ed if demand for SBA to purcr.a&e 3-
a rrques: to eitend the raturity is nor r-crr.vci by SBA *:thir. one \ ear after the maturity of the note. 
T'-.:s ^ r e e e m «'a ' •.*•„••- ;c rfc* :•?.'.«:;: -v, iud be binding Lnc-n :hr f a m e s , their successors and assigns. 
i* *;T \ r . " 5 l" ' f F ; >F, i a s r c rh'.r* •e;r»fr.en; tc be duly eiecured the date t irv a :err 
•;c:aw 
# r -£5T-
... &/s£l£^ 
Vir. Casklnette 
••jT^nlstratlve Vice P r e s e n t 
lapital City ?ank 
r? .*•<;£« 
v;re T f > - ^ t 
DISIHIC 
fUr., >k&U vxsrjut* jf/_ '.vbmi? :»•••• -r-jpitf tc SBA field office 
*di£lfdl* 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA 
SEFTEL, and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-1810 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, et al., 
Counterclaim Defendants, 
Before the Court is defendant and counterclaimant Capital 
City BanJ^s Motion for Summary Judgment. The interested parties 
through their counsel appeared and argued their respective posi-
tions. Following argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the Memoranda of Points and Authori-
ties submitted by the parties, and to conduct further legal 
research. The Court has now had the opportunity to carefully 
review and consider the arguments and legal authorities cited 
by the parties, review the supporting attachments and affidavits 
of the parties, conduct independent research on the applicable 
case authorities, and being otherwise lully advised, enters 
the following Memorandum Decision. 
In this case the defendant and counterclaimant Capital 
City Bank (hereinafter "Capital") has moved for Summary Judgment 
on plaintiffs1 Complaint seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs1 
Complaint as a matter of law. Capital has also moved for Summary 
Judgment on its Counterclaim against plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendants, including the plaintiff, the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electpric Sign Company, and 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., seeking from the plaintiffs 
the amounts claimed due on their individual guarantees, and 
an Order of foreclosure on the trust d^ed at issue, and for 
a further Order declaring that the interests of Capital are 
superior to the claims, if any, of the Remaining counterclaim 
i 
defendants, to wit: Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza 
Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, and!Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. 
The issues and arguments in this case have been carefully 
briefed by counsel, and therefore the Court does not undertake 
to review the authorities applicable to the various positions. 
The plaintiffs1 Complaint alleges against Capital in its 
first cause of action that Capital has breached the guarantee 
agreement executed by the plaintiffs in favor of Capital. The 
guarantees were made in furtherance of a note and trust deed 
executed by Bagel Nosh Intermountain, Ltd., (hereinafter "Bagel 
Nosh") in which the plaintiffs were principals. The guarantees 
are absolute, unconditional and personal as to each plaintiff 
in favor of Capital. Bagel Nosh has filed a voluntary Chapter 
XI Bankruptcy Petition. The issues in this case are governed 
by federal law in accordance with the agreements between the 
parties. Federal law is dispositive of the plaintiffs' first 
cause of action in that under applicable federal decisions from 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals the plaintiffs do not have 
an actionable claim for unjustifiable impairment of collateral. 
The Court is further of the opinion that even if Utah law was 
applicable, no breach can be shown, all as more particularly 
set forth by Capital in its Memoranda, the argument on which 
the Court finds persuasive on those issues. 
The plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges reckless 
loss of a security interest. The materials submitted clearly 
show that Capital perfected its security interests in the col-
lateral. It further appears that plaintiffs1 claim is again 
based upon Utah law which is not applicable under the agreement 
between the parties. Under federal law, Capital has no duty 
to maintain or perfect a security interest in the collateral 
in that the plaintiffs/guarantors have waived that defense. 
As thm record Is clear that Capital has in fact protected its 
security interests, even if Utah law w^re applicable, Capital 
has complied. 
Plaintiffs1 third cause of action alldges that the guarantees 
are of no affect, because the underlying obligation was modified. 
Under the terms of the guarantees, modifications have been authorized 
in advance by the plaintiffs/guarantors. Certainly, the modifica-
tions which are in actuality more favorable to the plaintiffs/ 
guarantors cannot be complained of at this jpoint by the guarantors 
where they have paid under the guarante^ since the default of 
the principal debtor Bagel Nosh, and ir not estopped at this 
point, have impliedly given their conslent to modification. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs/guarantors h^ve waived the defense 
regarding modification, and if they havfe not so waived that 
defense through the guarantees, they are estopped and have otherwise 
consented to the modification. 
The allegations of "material issued of fact remaining" 
by the plaintiffs are without merit. The plaimed factual issues 
either do not actually exist, or if thdy do exist, they are 
not material and substantial so as to require this Court to 
deny Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Sweeping aside all the legalese, the plJaintiffs have executed 
unconditional guarantees in favor of Capjital to induce a loan 
to their company, Bagel Nosh. Bagel Nobh has defaulted, and 
Capital is entitled to resort to the guarantees which the plaintiffs 
originally made. 
Plaintiffs have further alleged that an indispensable party, 
the Small Business Administration, has not been joined. That 
defense is without merit. In the first instance, the defense 
has not been pled, but additionally, the SBA is not under the 
present interpretation of the Rules of Procedure an indispensable 
party to this action. 
As to the remaining counter defendants, Utah State Tax 
Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign 
Company, and the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., to the 
extent that they assert interests in the properties that Capital 
seeks to foreclose, those interests are inferior to Capital's. 
The Court concludes that Capital's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
both as to the plaintiffs' Complaint, and as to Capital's Counter-
claim should be granted, and that there are no material questions 
of fact existing, and that the defendant and counerclaimant 
Capital is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. 
For the purposes of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court has granted Capital's Motion on all the 
bases alleged by Capital in its moving papers and supporting 
documents, with the exception of the claims of laches, which 
the Court determines would require a further hearing, and are 
not ripe for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for Capital is 
with this Memorandum Decision 
of the Utah Rules of Civil 
and submit the same in accordance 
for the Court1s review and signatu 
Dated this / day of 
Order in accordance 
rdance with Rule 52(a) 
to the bases granted, 
Local Rules of Practice 
:iHOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COU^T JUDGE 
H.QIXQfcSrNDLEv 
jerk 
By 22 
/ 
DeputvCifir* 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this <f day of February, 1987: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Herschel J. Saperstein 
Steven T. Waterman 
Attorneys for Def. Capital city Bank 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CpUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J 
BB 
I 
) 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
and MICHAEL LANDES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CAPITAL CITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
SIDNEY SEFTEL, THERESA SEFTEL, 
MICHAEL LANDES, UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, CROSSROADS PLAZA 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah joint venture and 
general partnership, YOUNG ELECTRIC 
SIGN COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and OLYMPUS HILLS SHOPPING 
CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
:ivilNo. C86-1810 
(Judge Hanson) 
PARTIAL FINAL 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
The motion of Capital City Bank, Defendant and Counterclaimant, for summary 
judgment in the above-captioned proceeding was, after proper notice, heard before 
this Court on October 27, 1986, In accordance with the Memorandum Decision in 
this proceeding dated February 4, 1987, and in accordance with Rules 52 and 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, there being no genuine issue as to any material fact, Capital 
City Bank having established that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as 
more particularly set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court specifically 
finding that there is no just reason for delaying entry of this judgment as final and 
good cause otherwise appearing, this Court enters its judgment and decree of 
foreclosure as follows: 
1. It is hereby adjudged and decreed that the absolute, personal, and 
unconditional guaranty of Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel, Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, executed on or about December 24, 1979, and the absolute, personal, 
and unconditional guaranty of Michael Landes, Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
executed on or about December 24, 1979, are valid, subsisting obligations of Sidney 
Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes. 
2. Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes, jointly and severally, in the amount of $293,319.64 as 
of February 15, 1987, plus interest on that sum after February 15, 1987, at the contract 
rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually until said sum is paid in full. 
3. The judgment granted herein is final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the clerk is expressly directed to enter judgment as final. 
4. In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed 
executed by Michael Landes on or about December 24, 1979, as a mortgage for purposes 
of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed is subject to a mortgage 
lien in favor of Capital City Bank which real property is situated in Salt Lake County 
and described as follows: 
Units 616, 617, and S-616 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according 
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in 
Book "KKff of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership 
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and the Exhibits attached 
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book 
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records. EXCEPTING, however, 
from the common area all mineral or underground rights and being limited 
to the surface rights only. 
5. The mortgage lien in favor of Capital City Bank referenced in paragraph 
4 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the plaims, liens, and interests of the 
\ 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., and all persons claiming by, through, or under 
each of them. 
6. In as much as Capital City Bank has elected to treat the trust deed 
executed by Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel on or about December 24, 1979, as a 
mortgage for purposes of foreclosure, the real property described in the trust deed 
is subject to a mortgage lien in favor of Capital Cfity Bank which real property is 
situated in Salt Lake County and described as follows: 
Units 705, 706, and S-705 of THE LODGE AT SNOWBIRD, according 
to the record of survey map filed for record as Entry No. 2411463 in 
Book "KK" of Plats, at page 5, together with a 1.16% undivided ownership 
interest in the common areas and facilities according to the Declaration 
of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, €^ nd the Exhibits attached 
thereto, recorded September 28, 1971, as Entry No. 2412081 in Book 
3001, at pages 808-817 of Official Records, an^ j amended by Amendment 
to Condominium Declaration of The Lodge at Snowbird recorded October 
26, 1977, as Entry No. 3014973 in Book 4569 at page 1149 through 1258 
and re-recorded December 16, 1977, as Entry No. 3039149 of Official 
Records. EXCEPTING, however, from the common area all mineral 
or underground rights, and being limited to the siprface rights only. 
7. The mortgage lien in favor of Capital c|ty Bank referenced in paragraph 
6 of this order is prior, senior, and superior to the claims, liens, and interests of the 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroad Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign Company, 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., all persons claiming by, through,, or under each 
of them, and all persons having liens, interests, and claims subsequent to December 
27, 1979, including the lien of John N. Whiteley, Barbara Whiteley, and Elan 
Management, Inc., pursuant to a judgment of this Court in Civil No, C85-6571 dated 
August 27, 1986. 
8. Capital City Bank is granted a judgment foreclosing the mortgage 
liens referenced in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein and ordering and directing that each 
of the real properties described in paragraphs 4 and 6 herein be advertised and publicly 
sold by or under the direction of the sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
accordance with the law with the parcel described in paragraph 4 being sold first 
followed by sale of the parcel described in paragraph 6, that the sales be subject 
to the redemption rights of any party in accordance with the applicable law but that 
the purchasers at the sales are given the right of possession of the real properties 
pending the period of redemption including the right to receive the rents, profits, 
and issues derived therefrom. 
9. From the proceeds of the sale to be conducted by the sheriff in 
accordance with paragraph 8 herein, the sheriff shall first retain his fees and then 
pay to Capital City Bank or its attorneys, the total amount adjudged by this Court 
in paragraph 2 herein to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael 
Landes, with interest thereon at the rate of 11 3/4% per annum compounded annually 
until paid together with the costs and expenses of sale and all other costs, including 
attorneys' fees as approved by order of this Court or so much of the judgment as 
the proceeds will pay and that the sheriff obtain a receipt for the amount paid and 
return the same to this Court together with a report of the sale conducted pursuant 
to paragraph 8 herein. 
10. After payment in full of all sums acjjudged due and owing to Capital 
City Bank, the unexpended and undisbursed remaining balance, if any, shall be deposited 
by the sheriff into the registry of this Court together with a report of the sale 
conducted pending further order of this Court. 
11. In the event the sales of the real properties in accordance with 
paragraph 8 herein yield insufficient proceeds to satjisfy the amounts adjudged herein 
to be due and owing by Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, and Michael Landes to Capital 
City Bank, then a deficiency judgment may be entered against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes jointly and severally for the deficiency remaining. 
12. Sidney Seftel, Theresa Seftel, Michael Landes, and all persons claiming 
by, through, or under each of them, and all persons (including but not limited to the 
Utah State Tax Commission, Crossroads Plaza Associates, Young Electric Sign 
Company, Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd., John N. VVhiteley, Barbara Whiteley, 
and Elan Management, Inc.) having liens or encumbrances recorded subsequent to 
December 27, 1979, upon the real properties described in paragaphs 4 and 6 herein 
and all persons claiming any interest in those real properties subsequent to the notices 
of lis pendens filed by Capital City Bank on those properties, are forever barred and 
foreclosed from all equity of redemption and claim of, in, and to those real properties 
from and after delivery of the sheriffs deeds, upon expiration of the period of 
redemption. 
13. Capital City Bank is granted judgment against Sidney Seftel, Theresa 
Seftel, and Michael Landes dismissing all claims of th^ complaint filed against Capital 
City Bank. 
14. The remaining issues relative to the award and proper amount of 
attorneys' fees to be awarded Capital City Bank ar^ to be determined by further 
orders of this Court. 
DATED this Jo day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
Timothy R. Hanson 
/District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
t Judge _ _ 
ATTEST 
4 DIXON I 
^A^r Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ATTORNEYS CERTIFICATE 
In accordance with Rule 4, Supplementary Rules of Practice — Third Judicial 
District, I, Steven T. Waterman, attorney for Capital City Bank, hereby certify that 
on the /S*~day of May, 1987, I served the foregoing Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure upon the following by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Daniel W. Jackson 
175 South Main, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent W. Larsen 
Thomas B. Green 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neil B. Smith 
P.O. Box 25728 
336 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84125 
Mary Beth Walz 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah State Tax Commission 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
MATHESON, JEPPSON <5c MORTENSEN 
658 East 180 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
John Whiteley 
Barbara Whiteley 
Elan Management, Inc. 
2676 Skyline Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Lisa W. Bennett 
3077 First City Tower 
Houston, Texas 77002-6760 
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ventories, supplies or benefits of re-
search and development or to estab-
lish facilities for such purposes, (1) the 
limitation on SBA's sha re of such as-
sistance is $250,000 multiplied by the 
number of separate small businesses 
participating in the Group Corpora-
tion; and (2) such assistance, including 
renewals and extensions thereof, may 
not be made for a period or periods ex-
ceeding ten years except that , if t he 
assistance is made for the purpose of 
constructing facilities, it may have a 
maturity of 20 years plus such addi-
tional time as is required to complete 
the construction. 
(b) Use of proceeds. Under the provi-
sions of paragraph (a) of this section, 
the raw materials, equipment, inven-
tories or supplies, or the benefits of re-
search and development must be pri-
marily for the use of the concerns or-
ganizing the Group Corporation. 
(c) Eligibility. The applicant corpo-
ration shall be owned by a group of 
small business concerns, including cor-
porations, partnerships, individuals or 
any combination of t he foregoing, 
each of which shall itself qualify as a 
small business concern which would be 
eligible for a small business loan. Each 
such concern shall sha re a need in 
common with the other small business 
concerns forming said corporation, t he 
satisfaction of which need is the pur-
pose for which the Group Corporation 
is being organized. Such Group Corpo-
ration shall file its application in the 
same manner as other eligible business 
concerns. 
(d) Antitrust exemption. In the event 
that such a corporation desires exemp-
tion from the prohibitions of the anti-
trust laws or the Federal Trade Com-
mission laws, it may obtain such ex-
emption by using the procedures pre-
scribed in paragraph (e) of this sec-
tion. 
(e) Procedures for obtaining anti-
trust exemptions. ( D A Group Corpo-
ration desiring an an t i t rus t exemp-
tion, pursuant to section 7(a)(6) of the 
Small Business Act, as amended, will 
include a specific request for such ex-
emption in its application. 
(2) On reviewing an application con-
taining an anti trust exemption re-
quest, the Administrator of SBA will 
consult with the Attorney General 
and the Chairman of the Federal 
Trade Commission with respect to the* 
exemption. Upon receipt of the writ-
ten approval of the Attorney General, 
the Administrator may make a finding 
tha t the formation of the Group Cor-
poration will contribute to the needs 
of small business, and may approve 
the exemption. 
(3) Upon the making of any such 
finding and approval, a copy of the 
finding and approval by the Adminis-
trator shall be furnished to the Attor-
ney General and Chairman of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and shall be 
published in the FEDERAL REGISTER. No 
action by such Group Corporation 
which has been approved by the Ad-
ministrator, and which act is in fur-
therance of the purpose approved by 
the findings pubhshed in the FEDERAL 
REGISTER, shall be construed to be 
within the prohibitions of the anti-
trust laws or Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of t he United Sta tes . 
(4) Even if not requested by the ap-
plicant, SBA may request ant i t rust 
clearance if it determines t ha t such 
clearance is appropriate prior to ap-
proval of t he loan to the Group Corpo-
ration. 
(f) Withdrawal of exemption. In the 
event t ha t t he Group Corporation 
withdraws its request for the exemp-
tion, or the Administrator withdraws 
his finding t h a t the Group Corpora-
tion contr ibutes to the needs of small 
business or upon the withdrawal of 
the approval granted by t he Attorney 
General, t he ant i t rust exemption shall 
not apply to any subsequent act or 
omission to act by reason of such find-
ing or request . 
8 122.10 Guaranteed loanH. 
(a) Individually guaranteed loans. 
(1) Individually guaranteed loans are 
loans made by a lender to small busi-
ness concerns under a Guaranty 
Agreement between SBA and the 
lender which is applicable only to a 
specific loan to an identified small 
business concern. Under such a Guar-
anty Agreement, SBA is obligated to 
purchase not more than 90 percent of 
the outs tanding balance of the loan 
authorized thereunder , toge ther with 
accrued interest , in the event the bor-
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rower has defaulted for not less than 
(50 days. SBA also has the r ight to pur-
chase at any time the guaranteed per-
centage of the loan. Writ ten notifica-
tion of any uncured default on a guar- | 
anteed loan hereunder shall be re-
ceived by SBA within 45 days after 
such default. (Default as used in this 
subparagraph means nonpayment of 
principal or interest on the due date.) 
Where SBA receives writ ten notice of 
uncured default after 45 days from the 
date of default by the borrower, the 
lender shall not be entitled to receive 
at any time accrued interest on the 
guaranteed portion of unpaid princi-
pal of the loan from the date of de-
fault by the borrower to the date of 
receipt by SBA of writ ten notice of 
said default: Provided, however, T h a t 
SBA shall not purchase the guaran-
teed percentage unless S 3 A shall first 
determine tha t said delay in notifica-
tion of default did not cause any sub-
stantial ha rm to the Government. 
Late receipt or nonreceipt of such re-
quired notice within 45 days by SBA 
will be excused only where written no-
tification was sent by registered or cer-
tified mail not later t han the fifth 
day, or by mailgram not later than the 
third day prior to the forty-fifth day 
after the original date of the uncured 
default. The evidence to establish the 
date of mailing shall be the U.S. 
Postal Service postmark on the wrap-
per or on the original receipt from the 
U.S. Postal Service. T h e evidence to 
establish the date of transmission by 
mailgram shall be the automat ic date 
indication appearing on the mailgram. 
If the postmark in the case of mail or 
the automatic date indication in the 
case of a mailgram is illegible, the no-
tification date shall be established by 
the best evidence available. T h e lender 
shall be responsible to establish and to 
retain evidence of delivery of the re-
quired written notification to SBA. 
(2) SBA shall automatically and si-
multaneously purchase its guaranteed 
share of the loan in the event of the 
commencement by or against borrower 
of any bankruptcy proceeding, receiv-
ership, dissolution or of a creditor 's 
rights proceeding pursuant to the pro-
visions of the Guaranty Agreement. 
(3) SBA makes a charge to the finan-
cial institution as set forth in Part 120 
of this chapter . 
(4) During the time tha t SBA may 
be obligated to purchase pursuant to a 
Guaran ty Agreement, the financial in-
st i tution may exercise a liquidity privi-
lege in the form of temporary ad-
vances from SBA not exceeding the 
guaranteed portion of the loan. No 
temporary advances may be made for 
less than 15 days. The total maturities 
of all such advances may not exceed 
90 days during any 12-month period. 
T h e repayment date of any such ad-
vance may not extend beyond the ma-
turi ty of the small business concern's 
I obligation to the financial institution. 
Advances may be made by SBA to the 
financial institution only while the 
loan to the small business concern is 
not delinquent as to principal and in-
terest. 
(5) Notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of the regulations in this part or 
any agreement entered into by SBA, 
!
5BA shall have the right to purchase 
ts guaranteed percentage of the lean 
f SBA shall determine tha t such pur-
:hase is in the best interest of the 
Government . If SBA shall exercise 
such right, t he financial institution 
shall immediately assign, transfer, and 
deliver to SBA the note and all instru-
ments obtained by the financial insti-
tut ion in connection with its loan. 
(6) SBA shall be released from obli-
gation to purchase its share of the 
guaranteed loan, unless the financial 
insti tution has substantially complied 
with all of the provisions of these reg-
ulations and the Guaranty Agreement, 
or upon the happening of any one or 
more of the following events: 
(i) Failure of the financial institu-
tion to close and disburse the loan sub-
stantially in accord with the terms and 
requirements of the authorizat ion ap-
proving the loan or the servicing of 
the loan in a negligent manner, either 
of which may result in a substantial 
loss on the loan; or 
(ii) Payment in full of the amount 
due on the note; or 
(iii) Receipt by SBA of written 
notice from the financial institution of 
the termination of this Agreement. 
(b) Simplified blanket guaranty 
loqiis. (1) Simplified blanket guaran-
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tcecl loans are loans made by a lender 
under a guaranty agreement between 
SBA and the lender which is applica-
ble to future loans to small business 
concerns JUS authorized by SBA. Under 
such a guaranty agreement, SBA is ob-
ligated to purchase not more than 90 
percent of the outs tanding balance of 
each authorized loan together with ac-
cured interest, in the event the bor-
rower has defaulted in payment of any 
installment of principal or interest 
when due and if the default continues 
uncured for more t han 60 calendar 
clays, unless SBA agrees otherwise. 
SBA also has the right to purchase at 
any time the guaranteed percentage of 
any loan in the interest of the Govern-
ment or the borrower. Any eligible 
loan which the lender would make 
only with the guaranty of SBA may be 
authorized by SBA under the guaran-
ty agreement. 
(i) If an uncured default occurs prior 
to October 1, 1978, wri t ten notification 
of such uncured default shall be re-
ceived by SBA within 45 calendar days 
after such default. (Uncured default 
means nonpayment of principal or in-
terest on the due date which remains 
uncured by subsequent payments from 
the borrower's own resources, but not 
from additional borrowing from the 
lender.) Where SBA receives writ ten 
notice of uncured default after 45 cal-
endar days from the da te of default, 
the lender shall not be entit led to re-
ceive at any time accrued interest on 
the guaranteed portion of unpaid prin-
cipal of the loan from the date of un-
cured default by the borrower to the 
date of receipt by SBA of writ ten 
notice of said default: Provided, how-
ever, Tha t SBA shall not purchase the 
guaranteed percentage unless SBA 
shall first determine t h a t said delay in 
notification of default did not cause 
any substantial harm to the Govern-
ment. Late receipt or nonreceipt of 
notice due within 45 calendar days by 
SBA will be excused only where writ-
ten notification was sent by registered 
or certified mail not later than the 5th 
day. or by rnailgram not later than the 
3d day, prior to the 45th day after the 
original date of the uncured default. 
The evidence to establish the date of 
mailing shall be the U.S. Postal Serv-
ice postmark on the wrapper or on the 
original receipt from the U.S. Postal 
Service. T h e evidence to establish the 
date of transmission by rnailgram shall 
be the automatic date indication ap-
pearing on the rnailgram. If the post-
mark in the case of mail or the auto 
matic date indication in the case of a 
rnailgram is illegible, the notification 
date shall be established by the best 
evidence available. The lender shall be 
responsible to establish and to retain 
evidence of delivery of the required 
written notification to SBA. 
(ii) On and after October 1. 1978, 
lenders shall be required to report in 
writing to SBA the repayment status, 
classification (paid in full, deferred, 
liquidation, etc.) and principal balance 
(outstanding or undisbursed) of each 
guaranteed loan on a quar ter ly basis. 
This quarter ly report shall apply to all 
guaranteed loans, provided uncured 
default by the borrower did not begin 
before October 1, 1978. Where the un-
cured default occurred prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1978, and remained uncured on 
such date, t he provisions in the pre-
ceding paragraph (bXIXi) of this sec-
tion apply. Each lender shall complete 
and forward to SBA, within 20 days 
after the end of each quar ter ly period, 
a s ta tus report which shall list each 
loan guaranteed by SBA and its s tatus 
as current or delinquent. SBA shall 
not be obligated to purchase the guar-
anteed percentage unless SBA shall 
first determine tha t any failure by 
lender to provide timely and accurate 
quarter ly s ta tus information caused 
no substantial harm to the Govern-
ment . 
(iii) SBA shall be released from any 
obligation to purchase its share of a 
guaranteed loan if the lender has not 
substantially complied with all of the 
provisions of these regulations and the 
guaranty agreement. Purchase by SBA 
of its guaranteed share shall not waive 
any right of SBA arising from lender's 
negligence, misconduct, or violation of 
any provision of these regulations or 
of the guaranty agreement. 
(Iv) As to any guaranteed loan ap-
proved by SBA that matures on or 
after October 1, 1978, SBA shall not be 
obligated to purchase the guaranteed 
portion where the demand for such 
purchase, or a request to extend the 
loan's matur i ty , is not received by SBA 
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within 1 year after maturi ty of the 
note Provided, however, Tha t if SBA 
rejects the request to extend the loan 
the lender shall have 6 months from 
the date of such denial to demand 
tha t SBA purchase the guaranteed 
portion of the loan 
(2) SBA makes a charge to the finan 
cial institution as set forth in Par t 120 
of this chapter 
(3) There is no liquidity privilege 
hereunder which the financial institu 
tion may exercise in the form of tern 
porary advances from SBA 
[Rev 3, 32 FR 11699, Aug 12, 1967 as 
amended by Amdt 10, 41 FR 33549 Aug 10 
1976 43 FR 44472, Sept 28, 1978 44 FR 
70456 Dec 7 1979] 
§ 122.11 Simplified bank loans 
This loan plan is designed to provide 
greater expediency in the processing 
of SBA immediate participation loan 
applications and applications for guar-
anteed loans. It is a procedure where-
by SBA may make a speedy evaluation 
of a loan and purchase or guarantee 
its share of the loan as soon as the 
loan is ready for disbursement. It is es-
pecially designed to accommodate t he 
stronger credit risks, not the weaker 
ones. 
(a) T h e financial institution shall 
initially agree to disburse and service 
the loan. 
(b) An immediate participation loan 
may be made only where a guaranteed 
loan is not available. 
(c) The financial institution's mini-
mum share of the immediate partici-
pation or guaranteed loan must be the 
greater of (1) 25 percent of the total 
amount of the loan, or (2) an amount 
equal to the financial institution's 
loan(s) to be refinanced 
(d) Where refinancing is proposed, 
SBA may require the financial institu-
tion's share of the loan to exceed the 
total amount of existing debts owed to 
such institution The financial institu-
tion must certify, in writing, tha t such 
existing debt is in good standing (pay 
ments and other obligations handled 
substantially a*s agreed) and is satisfac 
tory in ail respects 
(e) Immediately after disbursement 
of an immediate participation loan the 
financial institution shall submit the 
Title 13—Bus mess Credit and Assistance 
clos ing d o c u m e n t s a n d a m e m o r a n d u m 
of d i s b u r s e m e n t to S B A foi review 
§ \ll 12 Simplified early maturities par 
t inpuhons 
This loan plan is designed primarily 
to encourage a larger percentage of 
participation by private financial insti 
tut ions in immediate participation 
loans It is designed for preferred 
credit risks 
(a) T h e participating institution 
must initially agree to service the loan 
(b) T h e participating institution 
minimum share must he not less than 
the greater of (1) 50 percent of the 
total amount of the loan, or (2) an 
amount not lless than the participating 
institution's lloan(s) to be repaid with a 
part of the new loan The participant 
must certify in writing, t ha t such refi 
nanced debt is in good standing (pay 
ments and o ther obligations handled 
substantially as agreed) and is satisfac 
tory in all respects 
(c) All such loans shall be amortized 
on a monthly level principal payment 
ba£>is plus intjerest Only level principal 
payments made on or within 90 days 
of due date shall be fully applied 
toward I eduction of the participating 
insti tution's share of the total loan 
Upon expirat ion of 90 days after de-
fault of any payment of principal or 
interest due on the loan, and until 
such default is fully cured by pay-
ments as hereinafter stated, the pro-
port ionate interests of SBA and the 
participating institution shall be 
frozen or fixed in amounts equal to 
their respective percentages of interest 
as of the date of the last principal pay-
ment received prior to the default 
Whenever the proportionate interests 
of SBA and the participating institu-
tion are fixed or frozen, any payment 
of principal or any amount realized 
from the sale of collateral or from any 
other source Whatsoever shall be ap-
plied on the lpan and shall be shared 
ratably by the participating institu-
tion and SBA in proportion to their 
fixed or frozen interests m the unpaid 
principal balance of the loan outstand 
ing After thei proport ionate interests 
of the participating institution and 
SBA are frozen or fixed for the first 
time, the participating institution 
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shall have a single opportuni ty to 
resume early maturit ies reduction of 
its participation interest when borrow-
er (I) has cured in full all past delin-
quent principal and interest payments, 
and (2) has paid the next successive 
three monthly installments of princi-
pal and interest within 15 days of each 
respective due date. Thereaf ter , when 
any installment of principal or inter-
est is not paid within 90 days of due 
date, the proport ionate interests of 
SBA and the participating insti tution 
shall be frozen or fixed permanent ly . 
(d) The period of time during what 
the participating insti tution's share 
will be repaid shall be based on the 
same proportion of loan matur i ty that 
the institution's participation bears to 
the total amount of the loan; e.g., a fi-
nancial institution would be repaid 
over a period of 3 years if it partici-
pates 50 percent in a 6-year loan; or 
repaid in 6 years by participating 60 
percent in a 10-year loan. 
(e) No agreement under this loan 
plan shall establish any preference in 
favor of the participating insti tution 
in any collateral or security for the 
loan. At any time during the term of 
the loan while the part icipating insti-
tution continues to have an interest, 
regardless of whether the participa-
tion has been declared frozen or fixed, 
the proceeds from the liquidation or 
sale of any collateral or security sup-
porting the loan, payments by guaran-
tors, or any other principal payments 
due to be applied in inverse order of 
maturity, shall be paid over to, or 
credited to, the part icipating institu-
tion and SBA according to their re-
spective percentages of interest or ex-
posure in the loan based upon the out-
standing balance of the loan as of the 
date such principal payment is re-
ceived. 
(f) Upon the repayment of the ag-
gregate amount of amortized pay-
ments due the part icipating institu-
tion, it shall transfer to SBA, without 
any charge or expense therefor, the 
note and all collateral ins t ruments , 
and SBA shall assume servicing of the 
loan and sole custody and control of 
all collateral, provided t h a t at t he 
option of the participating insti tution 
it may purchase or enter into a new 
participation in the loan in a percent-
age of participation not less than its 
original percentage of participation in 
the loan and if shall continue to serv-
ice the loan. The new participation 
shall tl ten be liquidated in the same 
manner as the original participation. 
The participating institution shall 
have additional options throughout 
the term of the loan periodically to 
enter into new participations in the 
loan at a percentage1 of participation 
not less t han its original percentage of 
participation or may at any time pur-
chase or acquire the full outstanding 
loan. 
8 122.13 Purposes of loans. 
SBA extends financial assistance to 
small manufacturers , wholesalers, re-
tailers, service establishments and 
other firms when financing is not oth-
erwise available on reasonable terms. 
Financial assistance is extended by 
SBA to: (a) Finance construction, con-
version, or expansion; (b) finance the 
purchase of equipment, facilities, ma-
chinery, supplies or materials; or (c) 
supply working capital. 
§ 122.M Extension of loans. 
Actions taken by SBA pursuant to 
the au thor i ty of section 7(c) of the 
Small Business Act, as amended, are 
limited to such periods of time as 
appear necessary to avoid forced liqui-
dation of loans. Extensions are grant-
ed under this section only when it ap-
pears tha t no other course of liquida-
tion will result in a greater and earlier 
recovery of the indebtedness. 
8 122.15 Step-foy-step application proce-
dure for financial assistance. 
(a) Before applying to SBA, an appli-
cant should make every effort to 
obtain the financial assistance from 
private sources. 
(b) If unable to obtain the entire 
loan from a bank or other source, the 
applicant should ascertain whether a 
financial institution will make the 
loan if SBA agrees to purchase an im-
mediate participation or if SBA agrees 
to guarantee a portion of the bank 
loan In accord with the Guaranteed 
Loan Program as; set forth in the SBA 
regulations. 
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(e) SB A will consider an application 
for a direct loan where an immediate 
participation loan or a guaranteed 
loan is not available, and will consider 
an immediate participation loan only 
where a guaranty loan is not available. 
(d) An applicant desiring to obtain a 
loan from SBA should apply to SBA's 
office serving the terri tory in which 
the applicant's business is locate|d. 
However, if he desired to obtain coun-
seling or assistance in filing an app i-
cation from a regional office which is 
geographically closer to his business, 
he may do so. Addresses of SBA of-
fices are listed in Par t 101 of this 
chapter . 
(e) When an applicant first commu-
nicates with SBA's office it should be 
able to furnish a history of its busi-
ness, the amount of the loan desired, 
how it will be secured, the purpose of 
the loan and the na tu re of its busi-
ness. It should also be able to present 
current operating and financial s tate-
ments and, if available, the s ta tements 
for at least the previous three years, i 
(f) Applicant should furnish the 
names of financial insti tutions to 
which it has applied for financial asl 
sistance, the reason it was unable to 
obtain the financing applied for, and 
whether the financial institution, if! 
unable to make the loan by itself,] 
would make the loan in participation 
with SBA either under a guaranty or 
an immediate participation agreement; 
such information should have wri t ten 
confirmation from the lending institu-' 
tion and be submitted with the appli-
cation. 
(g) SBA's office will furnish appro-
priate application forms and any nec-
essary preparation information. 
(h) After filing application with 
either a financial insti tution or SBA, 
and subsequent to processing, the ap-
plicant will then be notified of the de-
cision either to grant or deny the re-
quested financial assistance. 
§ 122.15-1 Reconsideration. 
Reconsideration. Any applicant 
whose request for a loan is declined 
and any borrower whose request for a 
modification of a current loan is 
denied has the right to present infor-
mation to overcome the decline 
reason(s) and to request a reconsider-
ation. However, any decline due !o size 
can only be appealed in accordance 
with the procedures set fotth in Pari 
121 of the regulations. The right to a 
reconsideration of a declined modifica-
tion request exists only tor loans that 
are cur ren t in all respects; any loan 
which is past due, delinquent, or clas-
sified "in liquidation" is excluded from 
these procedures. 
(a) A request for reconsideration 
must be in writing and received by the 
office that processed and declined the 
original request, whether a District or 
Branch Office or Post of Duty Station, 
within six months of the initial de-
cline. After six months a new applica-
tion is required. 
(b) T h e written request for reconsid-
eration must contain all significant 
new information, or such modifica-
tions to the original request, that the 
appl icant /borrower relies on to over-
come the reason(s) for decline. The re-
quest for reconsideration must also be 
accompanied by current business fi-
nancial s ta tements . 
(c) T h e specification by SBA of any 
reason for denial of a loan request or a 
loan modification request shall not 
consti tute a waiver of SBA's right to 
deny such requests for any other 
reason. 
[Rev. 3, 40 FR 37029, Aug. 25, 1975] 
§ 122.15-2 Declined reconsiderations. 
An appl icant /borrower whose re-
quest is declined upon reconsideration 
has the r ight to request a further re-
consideration at the next higher 
office. T h e "next higher office" in the 
case of a Branch Office or Post of 
Duty Sta t ion is a District Office; in 
the case of a District Office it is the 
Regional Office. 
(a) All requests for a reconsideration 
at the nex t higher office must be in 
writing and received by the office tha t 
processed and declined the prior re-
consideration, within 30 days of the 
decline action. 
(b) Such request for further recon-
sideration must contain the applicant/ 
borrower's written justification for be-
lieving t h a t the decline action should 
be reversed. 
(c) Such requests for further recon-
sideration must state t ha t the appli-
3^4 
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rant /borrower is seeking action at the 
next higher office. 
[Kev :*. 40 FR 37029, Aiitf. 2ft, ii>75] 
$ 122.15-,'! Finality of review. 
The decision of the Regional Office 
shall be final unless (a) the Regional 
Office does not have au thor i ty to ap-
prove the requested loan or action, or 
(b) the Regional Director refers the 
matter to the Associate Administrator 
for Finance and Investment, or (c) the 
Associate Administrator for Finance 
and Investment, upon a showing of 
special circumstances, requests the Re-
gional Office to forward the mat ter to 
the Central Office for final considera-
tion. "Special circumstances" as used 
herein may include, but are not limit-
ed to, policy reconsideration or re-
evaluation by elements of the Agency, 
alleged improper acts by SBA person-
nel or others , conflicting policy inter-
pretations between two regional of-
fices, or o ther such considerations. 
[Rev. 3, 40 FR 37030, Aug. 25, 1975] 
§ 122.16 Credit requirements. 
An applicant must meet certain 
practical credit requirements estab-
lished by SBA. Principal requirements 
are as follows: 
(a) An applicant must be of good 
character as determined by SBA. 
(b) The re must be evidence tha t he 
has ability to operate his business suc-
cessfully. 
(c) He must have enough capital in 
the business so that , with assistance 
through SBA, it will be possible for 
him to operate on a sound financial 
basis. 
(d) As required by the Small Busi-
ness Act, as amended, t he proposed 
loan, whether direct, immediate par-
ticipation, or guaranteed, must be "of 
such sound value or so secured as rea-
sonably to assure repayment ." 
(1) Loan appraisals. Regional Direc-
tors are responsible for the proper 
evaluation of collateral offered to 
secure proposed financial assistance 
and of collateral pledged In connection 
with the administration and liquida-
tion of financial assistance. Such eval-
uation will be based upon appraisals 
made by SBA staff appraisers/engi-
neers, or o the r appraisal satisfactory 
to the Regional Director. 
(e) The past earnings record and 
future prospects of the firm must indi-
cate ability to repay the loan out of 
income from the business. In the event 
t ha t an engineering survey or feasibil-
ity study of a company's operation, 
earnings, management, competitive 
position, and related factors is desired 
in connection with a loan application, 
the nature and extent of such a survey 
shall be determined by a review of the 
case. A technical evaluation by SBA 
appraisers/engineers will contain a 
report on the following kinds of sub-
jects. The list is not all inclusive, 
merely indicative: 
(1) Principal company products. 
(2) Productive capacity. 
(3) Break-even point. 
(4) Sales. 
(5) Competitive factors. 
(6) Suitabili ty of present plant and 
equipment. 
(7) New machinery needed. 
(f) Security may include: Mortgage 
on land, buildings and equipment; as-
signment of warehouse receipts for 
marketable merchandise stored in sat-
isfactory warehouse; mortgage on 
chattels; or assignment of current re-
ceivables (accounts, notes or trade ac-
ceptances). T h e applicant may offer as 
additional collateral any o ther assets 
of sound value. A pledge of inventories 
generally will not be regarded as satis-
factory collateral unless stored In a 
bonded or otherwise acceptable ware-
house, when such Inventories are the 
only or pr imary collateral for the loan. 
(g) While t he questions of security 
and collateral are Important in deter-
mining whe the r financial assistance 
will be extended, they do not alone 
constitute t h e factors upon which the 
approval or rejection ot an application 
is determined. SBA at taches great im-
portance to management; t he inherent 
soundness of the business enterprise; 
its earnings record and prospects; Its 
long-range possibilities of successful 
operation; and whether t he granting 
of financial assistance will Increase 
employment or have o ther favorable 
effects upon the economic life of the 
community. 
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ruiMs AND GONDII IONS oi LOAN|S LOAN A D M I N I S I R A I ION 
9 122 17 Maturities 
The maturity of eac h loan (except as 
specifically provided he iem) is limited 
to no more than 10 \ e a i s except jhat 
such portion of a loan made1 for I the 
purpose of acquiring real property or 
constructing facilities may have a ma 
turity of twenty years plus such addi 
Mortal period as is estimated may be 
required to complete such constjuc 
tion 
[Rev 3 41 FR 2620* June 25 197«1 
8 122 18 Charges commissions and fetls 
(a) Payment of bonus, or brokerage 
fees or commissions for the purpose 
of, or in connection with, obtaining fi 
nancial assistance th rough SBA is iiro 
hibited The applicant, subject to SBA 
approval, may pay actual reasonable 
costs incurred in connection with the 
application, including such items as 
compensation, for services rendered bv 
at torneys, appraisers, and accoulnt 
ants, bu t in no event may an applicant 
make any payment in the naturei of 
such a brokerage fee or commission j 
(b) T h e applicant is required to cler 
Mfy the names of all at torneys, ac 
countants and o ther representatives 
engaged by him in connection with the 
financial assistance All compensation 
or o the r charges must be approved by 
SBA before payment is made, or if 
payment has been made, a refund of 
any excessive portion of the charge 
must be made to t h e applicant See 
Par ts 103 and 104 of this chapter for 
further regulations with respect to 
representatives and their compensa 
tion I 
§ 122 19 Loan closing 
If SBA approves a loan apphcatioln, 
a formal loan authorizat ion is issued 
by SBA This authorizat ion is not a 
contract to lend or a loan agreement 
Instead, it states the conditions which 
the borrower must meet before finan 
cial assistance will be extended Whe|n 
the borrower is prepared to meet these 
conditions SBA or the financial instil 
tution will arrange a date time and 
place for closing the loan ' 
t) 122 20 I otin administration 
(a) Immediate participation loans 
which are c losed by the bank will be 
serviced b> th< bank and immediate 
part icipation loans or ducet loans 
closed b \ SBA will be administered b> 
SBA However SBA reserve's the right 
to t ransfer the servicing of an immcdi 
ate participation loan from the finan 
rial inst i tut ion to SBA 
(b) Guaranteed loans will be serviced 
by the financial institution which 
made t h e loan The financial mstitu 
tion shall hold the note instruments 
of hypothecat ion and all other agree 
merits documents and instruments 
obtained by it m connection vuth its 
loan to the small business concern 
The financial institution shall receive 
all payments of principal and interest 
on the loan until such time as SBA 
may purchase its guaranteed share of 
the loan 
(c) In guaranteed loans (1) Pnoi to 
October 1 1978 the lender shall not 
without the prior written consent of 
SBA 
(l) Make or consent to any alter 
ations in the terms of the note or re 
lated loan instruments 
(n) Make or consent to any release 
subst i tut ion, or exchange of collateral 
except for simplified blanket guaranty 
loans, as s tated on SBA form 750 then 
in force 
(in) Accelerate the maturi ty of the 
note, 
(IV) Sell, assign or transfer the note 
or related loan instruments, 
(v) Sue upon the note or related loan 
inst ruments , 
(vi) Waive or agree to wai\e any 
claim against borrower or any guaran 
tor, s tandby creditor, or other obligor 
in connection with the loan, 
(vu) Directly or indirectly charge or 
receive any bonus, fee, commission, or 
other payment or benefit in connec 
tion with the making or s en icing of 
the loan, except reimbursement for 
charges or expenses incurred or com 
pensation for actual services rendered 
(see also § 120 3(b) (5) and (6)) oi 
(viu) Increase the amount of any 
prior lien held bv the lender on prop 
erty securing an SBA guaranteed loan 
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(2) On or after October 1, 197tt, t he 
lender shall not, wi thout the prior 
written consent of SB A: 
(i) Make or consent to any substan-
tial alteration in the terms of any loan 
instrument; 
(ii) Make or consent to releases of 
collateral having a cumulative value, 
as reasonably determined by the 
holder of the note, which is more t h a n 
20 percent of the original loan 
amount; 
(iii) Accelerate the matur i ty of any 
note; 
(iv) Sue upon any loan instrument; 
(v) Waive any claim against any bor-
rower, guarantor, obligor, or s tandby 
creditor arising out of any loan instru-
ment; 
(vi) Directly or indirectly charge or 
receive any bonus, fee, commission, or 
other payment or benefit in connec-
tion with the making or servicing any 
loan, except re imbursement for 
charges or expenses incurred, or com-
pensation for actual services rendered 
(see also § 120.3(b) (5) and (6)); or 
(vii) Increase the amount of any 
prior lien held by the lender on prop-
erty securing an SBA-guaranteed loan. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, 
"substantial" includes, but is not limit-
ed to, increases in principal amount or 
interest rate or any action tha t bene-
fits or confers a preference on the 
holder. 
(d) When SBA completes (i.e. per-
fects paperwork necessary to process 
disbursement) the purchase of its 
share of a guaranteed loan the finan-
cial institution shall assign the note 
and the other loan ins t ruments to 
SBA and loan servicing shall become 
the responsibility of SBA: Provided, 
however, T h a t with SBA's written con-
sent the financial inst i tut ion may con-
tinue to service the loan and be the 
holder of the note and the other loan 
instruments until SBA makes a writ-
ten request for the transfer of loan 
servicing to SBA; the financial institu-
tion shall thereupon assign and deliver 
to SBA all loan ins t ruments immedi-
ately after the receipt of such a t rans-
fer request from SBA. 
[Rev. 3, 32 FR 11699, Aug. 12, 1967, as 
amended at 43 FR 44472, Sept. 28, 1978; 
Amdt. 15, 45 FR 80484, Dec. 5, 1980] 
§ 122.21 Collection policy. 
It is the policy of SBA to insist upon 
prompt payment of due installments 
and upon compliance with all terms 
and conditions of the note, mortgage 
and loan agreements. Any request for 
relief should be directed to the partici-
pating institution or SBA field office, 
whichever is servicing the loan. No de-
viation in the terms and conditions of 
the note or other instruments will be 
condoned without the written approv-
al of the participating financial insti-
tution, if a financial institution has 
participated in the loan. However, in 
order to aid and assist borrowers in 
the discharge of their financial obliga-
tions, it is the policy of SBA to advise 
and counsel with borrowers in the 
management , production, and finan-
cial aspects of their business, with a 
view of encouraging the development 
of a hea l thy , growing concern. 
I? 122.22 Sule and conversion of loans. 
(a) Directors of the regional offices 
are authorized to effect the sale of any 
direct loan upon payment in the 
amount of the borrower's indebted-
ness. T h e consent of the borrower is 
not required. Loans made pursuant to 
the Small Business Act, as amended, 
and those loans which were trans-
ferred to SBA in accordance with Re-
organization Plans No. 2 of 1954 and 
No. 1 of 1957 will not be sold for less 
than the amount of the borrower's ob-
ligation. 
(b) Direct loans may be converted to 
guaranteed loans or to immediate par-
ticipation loans. 
(c) An immediate participation loan 
may be converted to a guaranteed loan 
or a loan wholly owned by the partici-
pating insti tution without the borrow-
er's approval upon payment of the 
unpaid amount of SBA's participation 
in such loan, together with the ac-
crued interest due thereon and any ad-
vances t h a t may have been made by 
SBA. 
(d) Any Guaranty Agreement may 
be te rminated upon receipt of a writ-
ten request from the financial institu-
tion, provided the guarantee charges 
have been paid to the date of termina-
tion. 
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$ 122.23 Liquidation policy. 
(a) It is the policy of SBA to aid, 
counsel, assist and protect small busi-
ness concerns to which loans have 
been made. Ordinarily, the liquidation 
of the property securing a loan will 
not be resorted to if there appears to 
be any reasonable probability t h a t the 
loan may be repaid by the borrower or 
a guarantor o ther than SBA within a 
reasonable period. 
(b) Liquidation of the security may 
be authorized or approved when any 
one of the following conditions exists: 
( D A borrower is in default in the 
payment of one or more installments 
due under a note or has defaulted in 
the performance of conditions con-
tained in the note, loan agreement, 
o the r instrument, or a security instru-
ment , and the failure to cure such de-
fault or defaults or to make acceptable 
arrangements to cure the same is due 
to (i) lack of diligence; (ii) lack of man-
agerial ability which the borrower has 
failed or refused to correct; (iii) o ther 
circumstances within the borrower's 
control; or (iv) t he inability of t he bor-
rower to remedy the default; 
(2) Foreclosure or other proceedings 
have been insti tuted which may 
jeopardize the interests of the Govern-
ment; 
(3) A borrower has filed a voluntary 
peti t ion or an involuntary peti t ion has 
been filed against the borrower pursu-
an t to any of the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act, as amended; 
(4) A receiver has been appointed or 
o the r judicial action taken for t h e pur-
pose of liquidating the borrower's 
assets; 
(5) The borrower has made an as-
signment for the benefit of creditors 
which may result in the liquidation of 
his assets; 
(6) The borrower Is in default and 
has discontinued or abandoned the 
business and has not submitted an ac-
ceptable plan of payment; 
(7) The failure of the borrower to 
disclose in his loan application any 
fact deemed by SBA to be material or 
the making of any false s ta tement or 
material misrepresentation by, on 
behalf of, or for the benefit of, the 
borrower In the loan application, in 
i 
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any of the loan instruments or in any 
affidavit or other document submitted 
in connection with such application. 
8 122 24 Foreclosure of collateral. 
(a)| Real and personal property, in-
cluding contracts and claims, hypoth-
ecated as security for the payment of 
a loan which is in default may be sold 
in accordance with the provisions of 
the hote or the security instrument 
whereby such property was hypoth-
ecated. 
(b) Payments or recoveries under or 
upon a loan from the borrower or 
from any other source as well as all 
reasonable expenses (including ad-
vances for the care, preservation, and 
maintenance of collateral securing the 
loan) incurred by SBA or the financial 
insti tution shall be shared ratably by 
SBA and the financial institution in 
accordance with their respective inter-
ests in the loan. 
(c) Any and all security or guaranty 
of any nature (excluding SBA's guar-
anty) , including but not limited to set-
off and counterclaim, which the finan-
cial institution holds or may receive 
fur ther to secure the financial institu-
tion with respect to a loan, or which 
SBA may require in connection with a 
loan, shall secure the interests of bo th 
the SBA and the financial institution. 
(d) Guarantors of financial assist-
ance, o ther than SBA, shall have no 
rights of contribution against SBA on 
a guaranteed loan. SBA shall not be 
deemed to be a coguarantor with any 
o ther guarantors. 
I 
8 122.25 Sale of acquired collateral. 
(a) Property acquired by SBA or the 
servicing! financial institution in the 
liquidation of loans will be offered for 
sale by the SBA or by the financial in-
st i tut ion which Is servicing the loan. 
All sales, unless otherwise authorized, 
will be effected th rough competitive 
bids at either an auction sale or a 
sealed bid sale. In those Instances 
where property which has been ac-
quired cahnot be sold advantageously 
at a sealed bid or auction sale, t he 
SBA or the financial institution may 
negotiate with prospective purchasers 
for the sallp of the property. 
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(l>) T h e right, title and interest of 
SBA in property sold will, unless oth-
erwise authorized, be conveyed by an 
appropriate bill of sale or deed, with-
out representation or warranty. 
(c) SBA does not look with favor 
upon rent ing or leasing acquired prop 
erty nor the granting of options to 
purchase, inasmuch as it is desirous of 
selling such property and thereby liq-
uidating its investment in same as 
soon after acquisition as possible. In 
those instances where the property 
cannot be sold advantageously as it ap-
pears to be in the interests of the Gov-
ernment to lease the property, propos-
als for a lease will be considered. Any 
such proposals must provide for termi-
nation by SBA upon the giving of rea-
sonable notice so tha t t he sale of the 
property may not be unduly delayed. 
Subpart C—Loans to Qualified 
Employee Trusts 
AUTHORITY: Sees. 3(c)(3) and 5(b)(6) of the 
Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.). 
SOURCE: Rev. 3, Amdt. 16, 46 FR 46308, 
Sept. 18, 1981. 
§ 122.301 Statutory provisions. 
The s ta tu tory authori t ies for these 
loans appear at 15 U.S.C. 632(c), and 
636(a). 
§122.302 Definitions. 
These definitions are used to clarify 
this regulation and supplement , but do 
not amend or modify, the Internal 
Revenue Code or Treasury Depart-
ment or Labor Depar tment definitions 
in thei r ESOP or ERISA (Employee 
Ret i rement Income Security Act of 
1974) regulations. As used in this sub-
part: 
Act means the Small Business Act, 
15 U.S.C. 631 ctseq. 
Employee means, in the case of a 
loan not involving a change of major-
ity ownership of the employer con-
cern's voting stock, every person who 
has been on the payroll of the employ-
er concern as a permanent , full-time 
employee in any capacity for at least 
30 days prior to the date SBA receives 
the application for a loan guarantee. 
In case of a loan guarantee to an em-
ployee t rus t to effect a change of t he 
majority ownership (at least 51 per-
cent) of the employer concern, em-
ployee means every person on the pay-
roll of such concern as a permanent, 
full-time employee in any capacity at 
the time such majority ownership is 
acquired. (Any person who has 
worked, or is hired to work, 1,000 or 
more hours over 12 consecutive 
months is considered a full-time, per-
manent employee.) 
Employee Organization means an 
entity representing at least 51 percent 
of the employees of the employer con-
cern and which maintains a trust 
treated as an employee trust . 
Employee Trust means a qualified 
employee t rus t or a trust (described in 
§ 122.306(b)) maintained by an em-
ployee organization. 
Employer Concern means the 
present, or prospective, small business 
concern with respect to which an em-
ployee t rust is receiving an SBA loan 
guarantee. It does not include a pro-
prietorship, par tnership, cooperative 
or other form of business organization. 
ESOP means an employee stock 
ownership plan as defined in the In-
ternal Revenue Code, Treasury De-
par tment regulations and Depar tment 
of Labor regulations. 
Qualified Employee Trust means, 
with respect to a small business con-
cern, a t rus t which forms a part of an 
ESOP (or a par t of an employee bene-
fit plan t h a t is treated as an ESOP for 
SBA loan guarantee purposes): 
(a) Which is maintained by such 
concern; 
(b) Which represents a t least 51 per-
cent of the employees; 
(c) Which provides t h a t each plan 
participant is entitled to direct the 
plan how to vote the qualifying em-
ployer securities which are or will be 
(as the SBA guarantee loan is repaid 
and encumbrances are removed) allo-
cated to the account of such partici-
pant with respect to corporate matters 
which by law, charter or by-laws must 
be decided by a majority vote of out-
standing qualifying employer securi-
ties voted; and 
(d) Which the In ternal Revenue 
Service has qualified in writing or 
which has been exempted in writing 
from appropriate Labor Depar tment 
regulations governing Employee Bene-
fit Plans under ERISA. 
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